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A test of a borrower’s likelihood to be able to maintain 
mortgage payments in the future. In Ireland this typically 
takes the form of examining bank statements and spending 
behaviours, in addition to examining whether the borrower 
would be capable of maintaining payments if they were to 
face an increase in the mortgage interest rate.  
bankable credit 
demand 
The proportion of total credit demand that could potentially 
be serviced under a prudent credit risk assessment policy and 
current macroprudential regulations 
binding When a constraint or policy threshold limits the feasibility of 
a particular choice 
bunching/clustering A number of data points with similar values  
buy to let A property bought with the intention of letting it out rather 
than owner occupation 
credit gap  The difference between bankable credit demand and the 
level of credit actually supplied; a measure of the unmet 
demand for mortgage credit 
debt service to income 
(DSTI)/repayment to 
income ratio 
The proportion of net income spent on debt payments. This 
can refer to either solely mortgage debt or a combination of 
mortgage and other debt.  
default A mortgage loan that is in arrears of more than 90 days 
delinquency status Whether or not a borrower is in mortgage arrears  
equity release  A financial arrangement that enables a homeowner to extract 
a lump sum or income stream using the value of the 
property, while continuing to own the property  
ex-ante default risk The future expected risk of default 
hedonic pricing A regression technique method used to estimate the value of 
a good (such as a property) to consumers. The price of a good 
is a function of various characteristics and external factors. 
This method estimates how much the price varies in relation 
to each characteristic/factor.  
Help to Buy Scheme A scheme for first time buyers that helps them to accumulate 
a deposit by means of a tax rebate 
impairment/impaired A mortgage loan that is in arrears of less than 90 days  
 
loan-to-income The size of a mortgage loan relative to the borrower’s gross 
annual income (expressed as number of times income)  
loan-to-value The size of a mortgage loan relative to the value of the 
property (expressed as percentage) 
macroprudential 
regulations 
Supervisory or regulatory policies imposed on financial 
institutions which aim to mitigate risk and to increase 
stability in the financial system as a whole 
non-binding When a constraint or policy threshold does not alter the 
feasibility of a particular choice 
strategic default The decision to stop making payments on a mortgage debt 










The Rebuilding Ireland Home Loan (RIHL) scheme was introduced in February 2018 
to provide low-cost mortgages to credit-worthy borrowers who are unable to 
obtain sufficient funds in the mortgage market. The scheme had approximately 
€414m in drawdowns (€218m) or live approvals (€196m) from February 2018 to 
September 2019. This report (i) provides a high-level review of the degree to which 
the scheme has met its objectives, (ii) scopes the need for ongoing intervention, 
and (iii) assesses selected operational considerations such as credit risks, funding 
considerations and its market impact.  
Microsimulation modelling of the Irish mortgage market suggests that a credit gap 
exists, with both income and equity constraints impacting households. In this 
regard, there is a clear role for the RIHL scheme to continue, in complement to 
deposit supports. The scheme does appear to be targeting lower-income 
households who are underserved by the market in urban areas. However, there 
does appear to be cross-over between market lending and RIHL activity in areas 
covered by the €250,000 house price cap. Some suggestions are provided for 
refinements to the parameters covering house price and lending limits to reflect 
these considerations.  
The main risk arising from the scheme is credit default and the impact on local 
authorities (LAs) if defaults rise. Evidence indicates that lower-income households 
(the target group) carry a higher ex-ante default risk. Planning to manage such risks 
is critical. In this regard, the central underwriting function undertaken by trained 
professionals at the Housing Agency is a strong feature. Observed deviations from 
underwriting recommendations have been identified and the Department has 
introduced measures to address this. Some further options for strengthening 
default risk safeguards should be considered.  
Given the size of the scheme to date, we do not consider it poses any material risk 
to government finances, nor has it had an impact on house prices. However, it 
should remain limited in scale to avoid market distortions, and the recent 
commitment to limit the volume of lending in this regard is welcome. Raising the 
base interest rate above the market rate for long-term fixed-rate products should 
be considered to minimise market distortions and ensure funds are allocated to 
borrowers with the greatest need.  
A number of data gaps are evident with the current scheme. In particular, no 
dedicated central database is available that links purchase prices, loan origination 
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features and borrower information. This gap should be addressed, and the granular 
data used to undertake credit risk stress tests and inform scheme calibration.  
SUMMARY OF MAIN CHAPTER FINDINGS1 
Market demand and scheme calibration 
• The RIHL scheme has approximately €363m in drawdowns (€178m) or live approvals 
(€185m) from February 2018 to June 2019. Drawdowns from the scheme to June 2019 
account for 3 per cent of first-time buyer (FTB) lending. An additional €40m had been lent 
in Q3 2019 to increase total drawdowns to €218m. Live approvals as of September 2019 
were €196m.  
• Microsimulation research indicates a credit gap in the Irish FTB mortgage market which 
could be met under prudent credit risk assessment. Both income and equity constraints 
are evident, suggesting that separate policies covering loan availability and deposit 
supports are merited. 
• There is a clear role for the RIHL scheme in alleviating a portion of this unmet mortgage 
demand on an ongoing basis. Estimates suggest that the instrument could provide a 
minimum of 1000 loans, valued at €200m per annum at current market prices. 
• It is clear the RIHL scheme would be expected to improve housing affordability for 
recipients relative to renting at new market prices or purchasing under commercial 
terms. Mortgages with a fixed term for the duration of the loan are welcome to remove 
interest rate risk for households and improve payment predictability. 
• Residential mortgage lending, i.e. loans issued by regulated lenders, is concentrated at 
higher levels of the income distribution and RIHL offers credit to lower-income 
households. 
• At present, there is little evidence to support an increase in the €320,000 house price cap 
in urban areas given the targeting of the scheme to low- to middle-income households. 
In these areas, the limitation of single borrower income thresholds of €50,000 would 
appear binding and could be revisited. 
• The house price cap of €250,000 for other areas would appear to be well in excess of 
most market prices in many counties and should be lowered markedly. The potential for 
a lower third tier that would distinguish more urban areas in the €250,000 group (such 
as Limerick and Waterford) from more rural counties should be considered.  
 
1  A range of data sources are used in this report. There are differences in the time periods they cover. An overview is 
provided in Table 2.2. In addition, since the analytical work was completed, an update to the Local Government 
Management Agency (LGMA) data (from end of June to end of September 2019) on the high-level numbers of the 
scheme has been provided. These new figures have been added to the text, but this may have caused some apparent 
inconsistencies throughout the report which may affect its readability.  
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Credit risk and credit assessment 
• The scheme has aligned its loan-to-value ratio with the level set by the Central Bank for 
FTBs, 90 per cent, which is a prudent step. 
• The credit assessment includes a maximum debt-service to income (DSTI) ratio, which is 
used by many countries as a macroprudential tool. The calibration of the RIHL limit at a 
maximum of 35 per cent would appear to be in the prudent range relative to international 
norms. The maximum tightens to 30 per cent for lower-income households, which is 
sensible. A tightening of the open allowance for lending above the cap should be 
explored. 
• As of June 2019, the default rate for RIHL loans (in arrears of 90 days or more) was 0.4 
per cent, which is identical to the default rate on commercial loans with a similar vintage 
from Central Bank data. 
• No data on loan-to-value (LTV) or loan-to-income (LTI) ratios at origination are available 
to analyse and this data gap should be addressed with haste. Requested loan-to-income 
data have been reviewed using microdata from the Housing Agency. 
• It is likely the default rate on the RIHL loans will exceed that on market loans over time. 
As the aim of the scheme is to extend credit to low-income households, once sufficient 
credit policy safeguards are followed at origination, a somewhat higher default rate on 
RIHL loans would not necessarily undermine the achievement of the scheme objectives. 
A withdrawal of RIHL lending for areas with arrears greater than 5 per cent of the portfolio 
has been introduced to safeguard against high portfolio losses that may arise. 
• A strong feature of the scheme is the centralised credit assessment. However, 
operationally, it is at the discretion of LA credit committees to make the final decision on 
the application. The data indicate that approvals have exceeded the level suggested by 
the underwriters in some LAs. Without access to adequate microdata at loan origination, 
it is not possible to assess whether this has already exposed the current portfolio to 
higher risks. The Department has already taken welcome steps to address this issue by 
ensuring that deviations from the underwriting assessment are reported and explained. 
Some further options for strengthening such safeguards could be considered, along with 
further credit risk minimising rules. These are discussed in Chapter 4. 
• Given the scale of the RIHL scheme relative to previous LA lending, it would be prudent 
to take stock of the policies, procedures and capacity of LAs to manage and absorb loan 
delinquencies.  
Market impact, scheme funding and interest rate pricing 
• Drawdowns from the scheme to June 2019 have amounted to €178m, approximately 3 
per cent of total FTB lending for this period. Our analysis suggests the scheme has not 
had any material impact on house prices nationally to date given the current level of 
drawdowns. 
• Demand for the scheme appears to have outstripped the original scheme volume of 
€200m over a 3 year period and approvals have continued above this figure. Following 
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the increased demand, the Department received sanction to increase the scheme size to 
€563m across 2018 and 2019. Careful monitoring of allocations, approvals and 
drawdowns should be undertaken on a timely basis to ensure that scheme commitments 
stay within the sanctioned amount. 
• It is also noteworthy that the geographic concentration of demand is greatest in the 
urban areas and excess demand may exist in these areas. This poses challenges for the 
current system of allowances at LA level. If an alternative mechanism could be developed 
to ensure activity remains within the sanctioned amount, it would be potentially more 
efficient to move away from a strict LA-level allowance. 
• The Department has agreed a scheme value limit that restricts lending to 5 per cent of 
total FTB credit. Such a restriction is welcome. However, directly anchoring it to the 
broader market restricts the ability to use the instrument counter-cyclically, i.e. if credit 
supply restricts the borrowing capacity of FTBs, the 5 per cent limit could be temporarily 
revisited. 
• For any loan product, the pricing of the interest rate is critical. The interest rates set by 
the scheme are lower, and at longer terms, than products in the market. This provides an 
affordability boost for recipient borrowers, in particular as the low fixed-rate term is for 
the duration of the loan. 
• However, two further points must be considered for pricing. First, interest rates should 
be set to adequately compensate for credit risks and second, pricing should be such as to 
minimise distortions to borrowers’ incentives and maximise the benefit of the scheme to 
those who most require these supports. Therefore, the base interest rate should be 
increased to above the rate in the market for the closest fixed-rate product to the RIHL 
terms. This is also consistent with lender of last resort pricing. Pricing can be cognisant of 
the additional cost of enhanced mortgage protection insurance (MPI) required under LA 
lending. Raising the interest rate will also tighten the DSTI limit as repayments will be 
higher for a given loan balance and term. 
• The level of pricing of the cost of funds to the LA from the Housing Finance Agency is in 
line with the cost to the state of long-term finance. Term risk or interest rate 
misalignment risk can therefore be mitigated through hedging. Future facilities under the 
scheme should constantly review the base funding rate to align it to long-term funding 
costs. 
• The level of the scheme at present does not appear to pose any considerable risks to 
government indebtedness or other macro-financial considerations. If lending increases 
markedly above the current RIHL share of FTB lending, this should be reappraised.  
•  In undertaking parameter changes or recalibrations of the scheme, policymakers should 
be cognisant of ensuring its continuation with minimum disruption to the market. 
Implications for policy and scheme monitoring 
In terms of the ongoing monitoring and assessment of the scheme’s functionality, 
a number of data gaps should be addressed. 
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• At present the following data gaps exist. 
o No centralised database is available that captures the loan exposures, monitors credit 
performance and contains collateral values and originating borrower characteristics. 
In particular, no data are available to analyse centrally LTV, LTI or DSTI ratios on the 
originated loans. 
o The Housing Agency database, which maintains a limited number of fields relative to 
the overall application, is not available to the Department officials for analysis, nor is 
it available to share across LAs. These data, from the underwriting assessment, are 
critical to understanding the credit risk, efficacy of the policy and the correct targeting 
of the scheme. 
o At present, borrowers can apply to multiple LAs and potentially receive different 
credit outcomes. LAs are not able to monitor applications to other areas or request 
data from the underwriters for applications to other areas. 
• A working group should be established to outline data requirements, and to ensure that 
data gaps are eliminated. This would fully review the information collected to date on 
specific fields and ensure that proper data collection is undertaken. 
• A considerable strength in the current data architecture is that the Department receives 
loan-level data on all LA loans that are issued. This should be used as a channel to receive 
all required information. Standardised collection templates should be followed by all LAs 
and any inconsistencies in reporting and data collection across LAs identified and 
eliminated. 
• These data should be used on an annual/biannual basis to undertake portfolio stress tests 
and assess the exposure of the loans to economic risks. The data can also then be used 









The Rebuilding Ireland Home Loan (RIHL) scheme was introduced in February 2018 
to provide access to mortgage financing to borrowers who are unable to receive 
sufficient funds in the commercial mortgage market, but credit-worthy from a risk 
perspective. Developments in the housing market in the years leading up to the 
policy’s introduction had been characterised by rapidly rising rents and house 
prices. This placed a considerable affordability strain on those in the private rental 
sector and, more broadly, young borrowers looking to enter homeownership.  
Recent research by Corrigan et al. (2019) and Allen-Coghlan et al. (2019) points to 
affordability pressures for potential first-time buyers (FTBs) and high housing cost 
pressures for renters. Stricter credit conditions on mortgages in the commercial 
sector, in particular in relation to the income leverage ratio, have been noted as a 
limiting factor in terms of accessing sufficient credit as house prices rose.  
Within this context, the RIHL scheme was introduced to provide a financing option 
for credit-worthy borrowers who could not receive the funds on the open market. 
The scheme provides a facility for the local authorities (LAs) to borrow funds from 
the Housing Finance Agency and directly lend to households in line with the 
scheme’s credit policy. The funding for the scheme was initially set at €200m over 
a 3-year period. The lending rates for the scheme were set below those in the 
existing market and the fixation terms offered are for the full lifetime of the 
mortgage.  
The objective of this report is to review the extent to which the scheme has met 
its original stated policy objectives in terms of aiding FTB homeownership. 
Furthermore, the report will consider the ongoing market gap for the scheme and 
whether the existing parameters are suitable, as well as assessing credit and 
operational risks that may arise, or have arisen, in relation to the current portfolio. 
Finally, it will provide recommendations for parameterisation, credit management 
and ongoing data monitoring.  
The rest of this report is structured as follows: Chapter 2 provides some 
background and context to the scheme’s introduction. Chapter 3 assesses the 
market demand and policy targeting. Chapter 4 reviews the credit policy, credit risk 
and other risks. Chapter 5 explores the macro-financial impacts of the scheme and 
scheme funding issues. Chapter 6 concludes. 
 
 




Background and context 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The economic recovery from the financial crisis in Ireland has been characterised 
by a rapid improvement in the macroeconomy and a strong labour market 
expansion, in terms of falling unemployment rates and rising incomes. Such sharp 
improvements in economic conditions, coupled with excess demand for housing 
from demographic pressures and low housing supply, have led to sharp rises in 
house prices and rents. While some recovery in the cost of housing was inevitable 
given the scale of price falls during the crisis, the acute affordability challenge 
facing many households, in particular those in the rental sector (Corrigan et al., 
2019), has increased the requirement for policies to improve the cost, and volume, 
of housing.  
Within this context, access to finance through the mortgage market has been a 
critical consideration. Among other structural factors, a tightening of credit 
conditions has occurred simultaneously through bank-lending conditions and the 
regulatory environment, with a fall in the share of mortgaged homeowners. It is 
within this context that the Rebuilding Ireland Home Loan (RIHL) was introduced 
to the market in February 2018.  
This chapter aims to provide the context within which this scheme was introduced, 
to explore the macroeconomic developments in the housing market that have 
occurred in Ireland in recent years, and to provide a brief general overview of the 
RIHL scheme and its activity to date.  
2.2 MACRO-FINANCIAL BACKGROUND 
2.2.1 From boom to bust: credit growth and loose credit conditions 
From a macro-financial perspective, the past two decades have been a period of 
considerable volatility for the Irish housing and mortgage market. From 2002 to 
2007, the market was characterised by rising house prices, rapid credit growth and 
loosening credit conditions. When the global financial crisis began to propagate 
throughout western economies, imbalances in the Irish housing market led to the 
onset of a systemic banking crisis. The macroeconomy deteriorated rapidly with 
unemployment increasing to 14 per cent in 2012, coupled with a rapid decline in 
house prices (Figure 2.1).  
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FIGURE 2.1 TRENDS IN UNEMPLOYMENT AND HOUSE PRICES 2005–2019 
 
Source:  CSO Residential Property Price Index and Monthly Unemployment Data. 
Note:  25–74 is the age range. 
 
The trend in the number and value of new loans, drawn from Banking and 
Payments Federation (BPFI) data, is presented in Figure 2.2. In the period from 
2005 to 2019 the number of new mortgages reached a peak in 2006 at over 
200,000. These included a considerable share of equity release and buy-to-let 
loans. The total value of new lending was €40bn in 2006. The lending levels 
dropped rapidly following the onset of the financial crisis. While there has been 
some recovery in mortgage lending since 2013, the number of new mortgages only 
reached 40,000 in 2018, at a value of €8.7bn.  
FIGURE 2.2 VOLUME AND VALUE OF TOTAL NEW MORTGAGE LENDING 2005–2018  
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As credit for house purchases soared during the period 2002–2007, the loans 
provided were underwritten on looser and looser loan conditions in terms of 
mortgage terms, loan-to-value ratios and loan-to-income ratios (McCarthy and 
McQuinn, 2017). Figure 2.3 presents the trend in the maximum available loan-to-
value, loan-to-income and debt service ratio in the market over the period 2003-
2011, from Kelly et al. (2018). These data represent the maximum credit conditions 
available to borrowers in each year. It is clear that credit conditions loosened 
considerably, with loan-to-value ratios reaching 100 per cent in 2007. Income 
multiples also expanded, from 5 times income to over 6.5 times income at the 
height of the boom.  
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FIGURE 2.3 TRENDS IN CREDIT CONDITIONS 
Highest Values of Loan-to-Value Ratio Available 
 
Highest Values of Loan-to-Income Ratio Available 
 
Highest Values of Debt Service to Income Ratio 
 
Source:  Kelly et al. (2018).  
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Given the loose credit conditions, borrowers had few buffers left to withstand 
economic shocks and the level of mortgage arrears rose to nearly one in five loans 
at the peak of the crisis, with an even higher share in the buy-to-let (BTL) market 
(Figure 2.4).  
FIGURE 2.4 TRENDS IN MORTGAGE ARREARS FOR PRIMARY DWELLING HOMES (PDHS) AND BUY-TO-LET 
(BTL) 
 
Source:  Central Bank of Ireland. 
Note:  ‘Mortgage arrears’ refers to loan accounts in arrears of more than 90 days.  
 
2.2.2 Recovery and the onset of affordability pressures 
Since the onset of the financial crisis, two structural changes to the mortgage 
market have taken place which have acted as a break on credit conditions. First, 
banks’ own credit standards have tightened and borrowers are subject to stricter 
income verification and stress tests than previously. This can be seen clearly in 
Lydon and McCann (2017), who show that few borrowers outside the top 40 per 
cent of the population income distribution receive mortgage finance 
(approximately 8 per cent in 2014), and that the proportion has fallen since 2009. 
The second change has been the introduction of a macro-prudential framework for 
mortgage lending by the Central Bank of Ireland. Introduced in 2015, the Central 
Bank of Ireland macro-prudential mortgage measures restrict mortgage applicants 
based on two concepts, loan-to-value (LTV) and loan-to-income (LTI). Under these 
rules, FTB applicants cannot obtain a mortgage worth more than 90 per cent of the 
house price (LTV) or that exceeds 3.5 times their gross annual income (LTI). This 
implies that the minimum deposit that homeowners must raise is 10 per cent. 
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to FTBs allowed above the 90 per cent limit and 20 per cent of the value of new 
lending to FTBs allowed above the 3.5 LTI limit. 
As the economy has recovered, house prices have risen rapidly. Figure 2.5 presents 
the average FTB house price nationally and for the highest and lowest priced 
counties. It clearly demonstrates the rapid increase in house prices from 2014 
onwards. The data also indicate the considerably higher level in Dublin than the 
rest of the country, indicating that affordability pressures are most likely in and 
around the capital city. Coupled with the tightened credit access in the mortgage 
market from the structural macroprudential regulations, the strong demographic 
pressures from rising demand have spilled over to the rental sector and rental 
prices have been increasing rapidly; Figure 2.6 shows that the national rental price 
index stood 25 per cent higher in 2019Q3 relative to 2007Q4. This confluence of 
factors has led to considerable housing affordability challenges for particular 
groups in the population (Corrigan et al., 2019).  
FIGURE 2.5 FIRST-TIME BUYER HOUSE PRICES 

















2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Mean FTB House Price - State (€) Max Mean FTB HP Min Mean FTB HP
Dublin
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FIGURE 2.6 RESIDENTIAL TENANCIES BOARD (RTB) RENT INDEX 2007Q3–2019Q3  
 
Source:  RTB. 
Note:  The rent index is calculated using data collated by the RTB from tenancy registrations. A national 
standardised average rent is calculated and then indexed using Q4 2007 as a base period (wherein the 
index is set equal to 100). The graph shows how the national standardised average rent has evolved over 
time with reference to the base period. 
2.3 OVERVIEW AND OBJECTIVES OF RIHL 
In response to the affordability challenges faced by potential FTBs in the market, 
the Department of Housing, Local Government and Heritage (DHLGH) introduced 
the RIHL on 1 February 2018. The main objective of the policy is to support access 
to homeownership for credit-worthy low- to middle-income FTBs who are unable 
to source sufficient funds elsewhere. The scheme, which provides mortgages 
through all 31 local authorities (LAs), replaced two previous LA programmes: (i) 
House Purchase Loan and (ii) Home Choice Loan.  
 
The main criteria of the RIHL policy are outlined in Table 2.1. Three loan products 
were originally offered under RIHL: a 2 per cent fixed-rate loan for up to 25 years; 
a 2.25 per cent fixed-rate loan for up to 30 years; and a 2.3 per cent variable-rate 
loan for up to 30 years. The variable-rate product was discontinued in August 2019. 
Mortgage protection insurance at an additional 0.5550 per cent must be 
purchased. The policy aims to avoid market distortions by capping the maximum 
market value of properties that can be purchased at €320,000 for properties in 
Dublin, Cork, Galway, Meath, Kildare, Wicklow and Louth, and €250,000 
elsewhere. These loans are not subject to macroprudential mortgage regulations 
such as LTI limits. Nevertheless, in contrast to the two programmes it has replaced, 
the RIHL scheme does set a maximum LTV ratio of 90 per cent, in line with the LTV 
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and middle-income borrowers, gross income caps of €50,000 (€75,000) for single 
(joint) applicants are applied. There is no minimum income limit.  
2.3.1 Policy description  
TABLE 2.1  RIHL POLICY CONDITIONS   
Criteria  
All loans are annuity mortgages including principal and interest 
(not interest-only mortgages). Three products offered: 
• 2% fixed for up to 25 years 
• 2.25% fixed for up to 30 years 
• 2.3% variable for up to 30 years – this has been 
discontinued 
Loan criteria 
Maximum value of the property: 
• €320,000 for properties in Cork, Dublin, Galway, Kildare, 
Louth, Meath and Wicklow 
• €250,000 elsewhere 
Loan criteria 
Maximum LTV ratio is 90% of the market value of the property 
so the maximum loan is: 
• €288,000 for properties in Cork, Dublin, Galway, Kildare, 
Louth, Meath and Wicklow 
• €225,000 elsewhere 
Loan criteria 
Mortgage protection insurance is required Loan criteria 
Applicants must be aged 18–70 years Applicant criteria 
Income limits of €50,000 for single applicants and €75,000 for 
joint applicants apply 
Applicant criteria 
Evidence of credible, regular saving over at least the past 12 
months. Under the 10% down-payment criteria, gifts are 
allowable up to 7% of the purchase price, with the remaining 
minimum 3% coming from evidenced cash savings 
Applicant criteria 
Applicants must provide evidence of insufficient offers of 
finance from two lenders 
Applicant criteria 
Primary earner on the application must have at least 2 years’ 
continuous employment and the second applicant must have 
at least 1 year’s 
Applicant criteria 
Applicants must not have previously owned residential 
property either in or outside of Ireland 
Applicant criteria 
The gross internal floor area of the property must not exceed 
175 m2 and the property must be in good condition.  
Property criteria 
Repayments should not exceed 35% of net income (unless 
approved by the local authority credit committee under 
Exceptions to the Policy in Section 8.4, which states they 
cannot exceed 40% of net income and these exemptions may 
not account for more than 10% of cases).  
Repayment capacity 
Each applicant is subject to a credit check using information 
provided by the Irish Credit Bureau and, from September 2018 
onwards, the Central Credit Register.  
Repayment capacity 
Variable rate loan repayment capacity is calculated with a 2 
percentage point increase in the current interest rate 
Repayment capacity 
 
Source:  DHLGH RIHL documentation. 
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Regarding the application process, RIHL applications are submitted directly to the 
LA in which the applicant wishes to purchase a property. This may not correspond 
to the LA in which the applicant currently lives. The process from application to 
notification of the decision is outlined in Figure 2.7. LA officials generally meet with 
applicants to ensure that all the required documentation has been submitted and 
to discuss the available loan options. Applications are then passed on to the 
Housing Agency for underwriting assessment, where qualified underwriters carry 
out the relevant credit assessment and judgement checks in accordance with the 
scheme’s credit policy, as outlined in Table 2.1. The Housing Agency then returns 
each application to the relevant LA with a recommendation on whether it is 
suitable to be approved. The final decision on whether to grant the loan is made 
by each LA’s credit committee,2 giving consideration to the criteria set out in the 
credit policy. It may decide to grant approval in principle or to reject, notifying the 
applicant of the decision.  
 
2  Credit committees are made up of at least three members, at least one of whom is from the Housing and Finance 
Divisions at Senior Executive Officer level or above. 
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FIGURE 2.7 INDICATIVE RIHL APPLICATION PROCESS   
 
Source:  DHLGH RIHL documentation  
 
2.4 AN OVERVIEW OF DATA SOURCES USED IN THIS REVIEW 
Throughout this review, we draw on a range of data sources to analyse different 
aspects of the RIHL policy. A detailed overview of all data sources used, the type of 
data, the time period covered, discrepancies between them and the chapter in 
which they are used is provided in Table 2.2.  
  
LA receives loan application
LA staff member may meet with applicant to check 
required documentation has been submitted, to 
discuss options and to verify identity
Applications are passed to the Housing Agency for 
underwriting assessment in accordance with credit 
policy
LA credit committee receives Housing Agency underwriting 
recommendation and decides whether to (i) grant approval in 
principle or (ii) reject the application, and notifies the 
applicant of its decision
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TABLE 2.2  AN OVERVIEW OF DATASETS USED IN THIS REVIEW  
Dataset Type Period covered Description Section 




May, June 2019 
Data for each LA on the cumulative 
number of RIHL applications, 
provisional acceptances by credit 
committee, drawdowns, live 
approvals remaining, loans in 
arrears and numerous other 












Data on the number of applications 
received for underwriting. These 
data refer only to applications 
underwritten by the Housing 
Agency. Applications are not sent 
to the Housing Agency for 
underwriting if they are judged to 
be incomplete, for example, and 
some are not processed as they are 
invalid. The data on the number of 
approvals are only 
recommendations and do not refer 
to those who actually received RIHL 
loans, as the LA credit committees 
make the final decisions on 










Anonymised applicant-level data 
including the following 
information: number of borrowers, 
age, number of dependants, 
employment status, occupation, 
income, savings, loan size 
requested, loan size approved, 
application status, loan term, loan 
rate, net income ratio (NIR), reason 
if application declined. The data 
contain all applications sent to the 
Housing Agency for underwriting 
from 29 of 31 LAs, excluding Meath 
and Longford. As above, these data 
are based on applications, not 
those who actually received RIHL 
loans, as the LA credit committees 
make the final decisions on 

















and March, June 
2019 covering LA 
loans issued at 
any time 
Loan-level data including the 
following key information about all 
LA-issued mortgage loans: amount 
borrowed, net instalment, last 
payment (broken out by capital and 
interest instalments), capital 
balance, revenue balance, arrears, 
drawdown date, term, elapsed 
term, interest rate, fixed/variable, 
LA, number of borrowers, borrower 
age. NB: These data do not refer 
3.4 
4.4 
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Dataset Type Period covered Description Section 
solely to RIHL loans. We use the 
drawdown date and interest rate to 
determine likely RIHL loans. There 
are discrepancies with the LGMA 










ESM is a nationally representative 
household survey conducted by the 
ESRI which surveys approximately 
800 households per month. It 
includes questions on the 
economy, savings and investment 
behaviour, the housing market and 
questions relating to whether a 
household wishes to enter the 
homeownership market and 
whether they have applied for 













2017 (annual).  
SILC is a nationally representative 
household survey. Approximately 
4500–5000 households are 
surveyed annually. The survey 
includes questions on household 
income, housing costs, 
employment, indicators of 
potential credit risk such as rental 
and other payment arrears, and a 





CBI  Administrative 
loan-level 
data 
2018–2019 Excerpts from the loan-level 
mortgage data providing 
information on numbers of loans in 








The PPR is a register of all 
residential properties sold in 
Ireland and is based on stamp duty 
declarations to the Revenue 
Commissioners. The PPR contains 
information on the sale price, date, 
new build/existing property, and 





2.5 SCHEME ACTIVITY TO DATE: HIGH-LEVEL OVERVIEW 
For the purposes of giving a high-level overview of scheme activity, in this section 
we use data on the total number of RIHL applications made by the end of June 
2019. The LGMA provides these data to the DHLGH. As of the end of June 2019, 
5488 applications had been made for the scheme, with 2408 applications granted 
provisional approval and 1021 loans actually drawn down. Our analysis throughout 
this report using LGMA data is based on data as of the end of June 2019, as these 
were the most recent data available during the analytical phase of this report. 
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However, data available as of September 2019 indicate that the number of 
provisional approvals has risen to 2875, with 1253 loans drawn down.  
Figure 2.8 presents the percentage of total applications made in each LA. The 
largest number of applications has been made in Fingal and Dublin City, followed 
by South Dublin and Kildare. More generally, the highest numbers of applications 
are seen in the east and south-west, in the areas containing and surrounding Dublin 
and Cork. Two-thirds of applications have been made in LAs with the higher 
€320,000 house price threshold, with the four Dublin LAs accounting for one-third 
of the total applications. This is unsurprising as affordability pressures are more 
acute in urban areas, particularly in Dublin and surrounding counties.  
While the four Dublin LAs accounted for one-third of applications, Table 2.3 shows 
that they accounted for 42 per cent of application approvals and 39 per cent of 
drawdowns. From column 4 in Table 2.3, it is also clear that there is substantial 
variation in the acceptance rate across LAs, ranging from 19 per cent in Cavan to 
90 per cent in Dublin City. There are likely to be several reasons for this: differences 
in the validity/completeness of applications; variation in take-up of the scheme by 
LAs; differences in the decisions taken by each LA’s credit committee; and how 
closely they follow the underwriting recommendation from the Housing Agency. 
This is explored further throughout this review.  
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FIGURE 2.8  PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL RIHL APPLICATIONS MADE IN EACH LA  
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Carlow 93 39 41.9 15 1,993,400 
Cavan 48 9 18.8 <5 * 
Clare 86 40 46.5 24 3,025,760 
Cork City 195 66 33.8 7 1,275,400 
Cork County 323 178 55.1 68 10,229,786 
Donegal 39 24 61.5 10 675,005 
Dublin:      




143 36 25.2 9 2,078,421 
 Fingal 723 328 45.4 127 28,320,799 
 South Dublin 401 117 29.2 55 12,642,453 
Galway City  118 43 36.4 19 3,109,955 
Galway County 182 49 26.9 35 4,421,856 
Kerry 163 51 31.3 14 1,887,920 
Kildare 369 73 19.8 42 9,105,522 
Kilkenny 51 32 62.7 13 1,765,240 
Laois 142 55 38.7 29 3,944,297 
Leitrim 18 5 27.8 <5 * 
Limerick 198 76 38.4 26 2,981,200 
Longford 46 22 47.8 11 683,580 
Louth 127 73 57.5 32 5,440,783 
Mayo 90 52 57.8 17 1,917,345 
Meath 269 144 53.5 79 15,602,930 
Monaghan 48 11 22.9 6 393,700 
Offaly 70 22 31.4 6 584,207 
Roscommon 51 22 43.1 7 632,850 
Sligo 55 22 40.0 10 1,091,000 
Tipperary 281 56 19.9 26 2,786,316 
Waterford 121 39 32.2 24 3,509,479 
Westmeath 63 26 41.3 12 1,996,500 
Wexford 142 78 54.9 51 5,376,160 
Wicklow 241 87 36.1 34 7,277,475 
Total 5488 2408 43.9 1021 178,661,239 
 
Source:  LGMA data on RIHL applications, acceptances and drawdowns. 
Note:  * No. and value of drawdowns not reported individually if number is <5 in an LA. These numbers and values are 
included in the totals.  
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Putting the level of lending under the RIHL scheme into context, Figure 2.9 presents 
the volume and the value of RIHL loans drawn down relative to total first-time 
buyer (FTB) drawdowns from regulated mortgage providers from BPFI data 2018–
2019Q2. It shows that 1021 RIHL loans at a value of €0.179bn were drawn down 
relative to 28,445 loans at a value of €6.26bn drawn down from regulated 
mortgage providers. RIHL has therefore accounted for a very small share of loans 
issued to FTBs – approximately 3.5 per cent of the number of FTB loans issued 
between the start of Q1 2018 and the end of Q2 2019 – and 2.8 per cent of the 
value of loans. 
FIGURE 2.9 RIHL LOANS AS A PROPORTION OF TOTAL FTB LENDING (VOLUME AND VALUE) 
 





















Market demand assessment and policy targeting 
3.1  INTRODUCTION 
The objectives of this section are fourfold. First we draw on work by Corrigan et al. 
(2020) to provide an assessment of the level of demand for mortgage credit in the 
Irish first-time buyer (FTB) market and the potential role for state-backed mortgage 
credit in meeting the unmet demand for credit. Second, we analyse the profile of 
borrowers applying for the RIHL scheme and then compare with those accessing 
mortgage credit through the banking sector to provide evidence that the RIHL 
scheme aims to target a different segment of the population. Third, we discuss the 
likely impacts of the scheme on affordability and increasing the stability of 
borrowers’ monthly payments. Finally, we assess the suitability of the current 
house price and income thresholds of the scheme.  
3.2 MICROSIMULATION ASSESSMENT OF MORTGAGE DEMAND 
3.2.1  Credit gap 
To begin our formal analysis of the level of mortgage demand among FTBs, we 
draw on the findings of Corrigan et al. (2020),3 who estimate the latent demand 
for, and access to, mortgage credit of potential FTB households in Ireland. By 
combining new Economic Sentiment Monitor (ESM) survey data on the share of 
households with a demand for homeownership with the nationally representative 
Irish Survey on Income and Living Conditions (SILC) dataset, they estimate the level 
of latent, underlying credit demand that could be serviced by the market given 
prudent credit risk assessment and the current regulatory environment. 
Comparing this level of demand with the actual level of mortgage credit supplied 
to FTBs enables them to estimate the magnitude of the current level of unmet 
mortgage demand in the Irish FTB market.  
 
3  The figures in Corrigan et al. (forthcoming) are preliminary working figures and are subject to change. 
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Source: Corrigan et al. (2020), Figure 2. 
 
Corrigan et al. (2020) first introduce the concept of bankable credit demand, which 
they define as the proportion of total latent credit demand that could potentially 
be serviced under a prudent credit risk assessment policy and current 
macroprudential regulations. Figure 3.1 provides a graphical depiction. Total latent 
credit demand can be split into bankable demand and two separate groups of non-
bankable demand: those who are inherently high credit risk and those who are 
constrained by macroprudential regulations and current credit conditions. Of the 
potentially bankable demand, a certain proportion will receive credit, while the 
remaining households will not and are classified as part of the credit gap, or unmet 
demand. 
To determine the households who are inherently high credit risk and therefore 
excluded from the measure of bankable demand, they apply the following criteria: 
any periods of unemployment for the head of the household; rent, utilities or 
consumer loan arrears in the past 12 months; current debt4 is a burden and they 
face at least one material deprivation indicator5 or difficulty making ends meet; or 
they are unable to meet an unexpected expense and they face at least one material 
deprivation indicator or difficulty making ends meet. 
For the remaining households, the authors then test how many households could 
conceivably be able to borrow to purchase a home under the current wealth (loan-
to-value, LTV), income (loan-to-income, LTI) and affordability stress criteria set out 
 
4  Current debt refers to car loans, credit cards and other consumer loans.  
5  Material deprivation indicators include: had to go without heating due to lack of money; deprived of two pairs of 
shoes; deprived of roast joint of meat (or equivalent) once a week; deprived of meal containing meat, fish, or 
vegetarian equivalent every second day; unable to replace worn-out clothes with new; unable to afford warm, 
waterproof coat; deprived of ability to keep home warm; unable to replace worn-out furniture; deprived of get-
together with friends or family for drink or meal once a month; unable to buy presents for family at least once a year; 
deprived of a social activity in past two weeks due to lack of money; at least one day in past two weeks where could 
not have substantial meal due to lack of money. 
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in the macroprudential regulations of the Central Bank of Ireland  (CBI) and the 
consumer protection code. More specifically, they use data on household income 
(LTI channel), an estimate of their savings6 that could be used as a down-payment 
(LTV channel) and whether in the face of a 2 percentage point increase in the 
interest rate, they would have sufficient residual income after making mortgage 
payments to attain their minimum required expenditure (affordability stress test) 
to calculate three maximum potential house prices that a household could afford. 
If the lowest of these house prices is above the 25th percentile of the actual 
transacted house price distribution in their county,7 they are classified as bankable 
demand. 
In essence, households in the bankable demand category are the households who 
should be able to obtain a mortgage on the market to purchase a property given 
the current regulatory environment and their credit risk status. Comparing this 
level of demand to the actual level of supply in the market can provide an estimate 
of the credit gap. The gap can occur due to three factors: (a) bank rejections; (b) 
borrower discouragement; and (c) the flow rate of how households turn mortgage 
demand into a housing market transaction. The last of these can arise due to 
households’ inability to find a property or other market search frictions.  
3.2.2 Measuring bankable demand 
Summarising Corrigan et al.’s (2020) main findings in the context of the rental 
sector8 as a whole, Figure 3.2 shows that 7 per cent of the current rental market 
have bankable mortgage demand, with a further 31 per cent of rental households 
considered to have non-bankable demand, either due to being high credit risk or 
due to having an insufficient down-payment (LTV), having an insufficient income 
(LTI) or failing the affordability stress test. These estimates refer to the stock of 
households with potentially serviceable mortgage demand; it is unlikely that all 
these households would actually attempt to obtain credit during any one year. If 
all the households in this estimate were to come forward for lending 
simultaneously, this would imply an approximate doubling of the number of 
mortgage loans currently granted. 
 
6  See Corrigan et al. (2020), Section 3.2.3.1 for the methodology used to calculate this.  
7  This condition is necessary to ensure households could purchase a property given current house prices. The authors 
explain that they use house prices at the 25th percentile for each county because Gaffney (2018) shows that the vast 
majority of sales below that point of the house price distribution are made by cash and institutional investors; 
approximately 95 per cent of properties at the 10th percentile and 80 per cent of properties at the 20th percentile, 
with very low levels bought by FTBs.  
8  In their analysis Corrigan et al. (2020) include all households currently living in the private rental, LA 
rental and rent-free sectors.  
22 |  Review of  the Rebu i ld ing I re land  Home Loan  Scheme  
 
 
FIGURE 3.2 PROPORTION OF RENTAL SECTOR WITH BANKABLE DEMAND 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
3.2.3 Understanding credit access issues 
This framework can be used to explore which specific issues are limiting 
households from accessing the mortgage market of the following: (a) sufficient 
income (LTI), (b) sufficient deposit (LTV), (c) sufficient affordability (stress test). By 
excluding the households with high credit risk status, we can understand the 
relative magnitude of these channels.  
Figure 3.3(a) shows that half of non-high credit risk households with a demand for 
mortgage credit are unable to access sufficient credit under the prevailing market 
and macroprudential regulations, and are therefore excluded from the measure of 
bankable credit demand. The vast majority of these households are unable to 
access credit due to having an insufficient down-payment for a property. 
Approximately a quarter of households have insufficient income, while one-fifth 
would fail an affordability stress test. Figure 3.3(b) shows that for non-high credit 
risk households with a demand for mortgage credit, the maximum house price they 
could afford is most commonly restricted by their income (45 per cent), followed 
by the down-payment (41 per cent). This illustrates the dual issues faced by many 
prospective homeowners: the majority face difficulties in raising a sufficient 
deposit, while many of those who overcome this challenge are then faced with 
constraints on the amount they are able to borrow due to their income.  
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FIGURE 3.3  PERCENTAGE OF NON-HIGH CREDIT RISK HOUSEHOLDS WITH MORTGAGE DEMAND 
 
(a) Reason unable to access credit   (b) Factor determining maximum house price 
 
Source:  Constructed from Tables 6 and 7 in Corrigan et al. (2020) using SILC and ESM data and the method described in this 
section of this report. 
Note: The reasons households are unable to access credit are not mutually exclusive, i.e. a household may face more than 
one reason.  
 
3.2.4 Providing an aggregate estimate of the credit gap 
In order to obtain an aggregate estimate of the annual unmet mortgage demand, 
Corrigan et al. (2020) compare Banking and Payments Federation Ireland (BPFI) 
data on actual new mortgage approvals for FTBs with three scenarios for the rate 
at which households actually come forward to turn latent credit demand into 
realised credit demand. The three scenarios allow 10 (low), 30 (medium) and 50 
(high) per cent of households to realise their credit demand in a particular year. 
The middle scenario of 30 per cent is based on the application rate observed in the 
ESM data.  
These estimates indicate that, depending on the rate at which households actually 
realise their credit demand, 2000–9000 additional new loans could be approved 
on an annual basis (Figure 3.4(a)), at a value of €0.4–1.95bn (Figure 3.4(b)). It is 
important to note at this stage that the magnitude of estimated unmet demand 
for mortgage credit is sensitive to the assumptions made. The authors make fairly 
strict assumptions throughout to avoid imprudent lending, leading to conservative 
estimates of unmet mortgage demand. Loosening any of these credit risk criteria, 
or for example allowing households to purchase houses below the 25th percentile 
of the house price distribution, would increase the estimated level of unmet 
demand. Indeed, in a sensitivity check, the authors allow households to purchase 
properties at or above the 10th percentile of the house price distribution.9 This 
would suggest that the credit gap would increase to 7766 in the middle scenario 
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from 5608, with an increase to 4125 in the number of loans that RIHL could account 
for relative to 3489 in the baseline estimates. Full details are presented in Appendix 
I.  
One important point to note about the SILC data used in Corrigan et al. (2020) is 
that SILC is a household survey and therefore only captures existing rental 
households. Their estimates will therefore not capture demand from those yet to 
form an independent household, such as those living with family while trying to 
save for a down-payment. These estimates of excess demand for mortgage credit 
among current renters can therefore be thought of as a lower bound in terms of 
the current credit gap for all potential FTBs. Nevertheless, regardless of the precise 
magnitude, Corrigan et al.’s findings clearly demonstrate that there is considerable 
excess demand for mortgage finance that could be serviced under prudent credit 
risk assessment, relative to the level of credit actually supplied in the Irish FTB 
market at present. A visual overview of the key steps in Corrigan et al.’s 
microsimulation model is provided in Figure 3.5.  
FIGURE 3.4  NUMBER AND VALUE OF POTENTIAL ADDITIONAL LOANS TO SERVICE UNMET BANKABLE 
DEMAND  
(a) Number of loans      (b) Loan value (€bn) 
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FIGURE 3.5  VISUAL OVERVIEW OF CORRIGAN ET AL.’S MICROSIMULATION MODEL  
 
Source:  Authors’ creation based on Corrigan et al. (2020). 
3.2.5 Role for RIHL to address credit gap 
Having documented the existence of a considerable unmet underlying demand for 
mortgage credit in the Irish FTB market, Corrigan et al. (2020) explore whether an 
instrument such as RIHL could potentially address a portion of this unmet demand. 
The authors perform a microsimulation exercise where they approximate the 
current parameters of the scheme and then estimate how many households could 
be eligible for the RIHL. In practice, the RIHL scheme removes the maximum 3.5 
loan to income ratio and the need for an affordability interest rate rise stress test 
as they focus on the 30 year fixed-rate option. Eligibility criteria for incomes, age 
and the maximum permitted house prices are applied in line with the current 
parameters of the scheme. The 90 per cent LTV and credit risk assessment remain 
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unchanged. Loans whose repayments are above 35 per cent of net monthly income 
are restricted to fewer than 10 per cent of the group total.10 
The results of this preliminary analysis are presented in Table 3.1.11 Their estimates 
show that between 1163 and 5815 households could be eligible for RIHL on an 
annual basis, depending on the rate that households actually realise their credit 
demand. This corresponds to an implied total loan value of between €200m and 
€0.98bn. It must be noted that if the intervention was to be at the higher end of 
the estimates in a calendar year, this would likely have an impact on house prices. 
A more formal assessment should be undertaken to explore this in more detail.  
TABLE 3.1  ESTIMATED RIHL LOAN ELIGIBILITY   
 
Demand flow rate 
10% 30% 50% 
Implied RIHL loan numbers 1163 3489 5815 
Implied additional value loans (€bn) 0.20 0.59 0.98 
Implied RIHL drawdowns 930 2791 4652 
Implied value of drawdowns (€bn) 0.156 0.468 0.78 
 
Source:  Corrigan et al. (2020), Table 12. 
 
3.2.6 Cross-over between RIHL and Help to Buy Scheme 
The findings of Corrigan et al. (2020) that households face both income and equity 
constraints suggest that separate policies covering loan availability and deposit 
supports are merited. A thorough comparison of the RIHL and Help to Buy (HTB) 
schemes, the cohorts they target and their relative merits is outside the scope of 
this report. As Corrigan et al. (2020) find more households face down-payment 
constraints, it is not surprising that more households have accessed the HTB 
scheme relative to RIHL: 13,955 HTB claims were approved between July 2016 and 
August 2019, compared to 1957 (1021 drawdowns plus 936 live approvals) for the 
RIHL in the shorter period of February 2018 to June 2019. While there may be some 
cross-over between the two schemes, the parameters of the respective schemes 
would suggest they aim to target different borrower types. The RIHL is specifically 
targeted at low- to middle-income households, while HTB has no income limits. 
 
10  Corrigan et al. (2020) note that it is not possible to 100 per cent approximate all the credit conditions of the actual 
RIHL scheme given the SILC data. Instead they attempt to mirror the conditions with proxies and overlay this with 
conditions that can be well matched. For example, throughout the paper, Corrigan et al. (2020) abstract from other 
costs such as mortgage or house insurance that borrowers must also incur and focus solely on the repayment. In the 
case of RIHL, this means that the mortgage protection insurance (MPI) cost of 0.555 per cent is not included in the 
repayment analysis. If this was to be included, it would reduce the number of households who would be eligible for 
the scheme. Some other explicit differences are discussed in the paper.  
11  The figures in Corrigan et al. (2020) are preliminary working figures and are subject to revisions and changes.  
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Given the generally large house prices of HTB borrowers (Parliamentary Budget 
Office, 2019), the HTB scheme would broadly appear to target households higher 
up the income distribution who lack the required down-payment.  
Due to data gaps, it is not possible to quantify the actual level of cross-over 
between the HTB and RIHL schemes i.e. people accessing both schemes. 
Department of Housing, Local Government and Heritage (DHLGH) data on the 
number of local authority (LA) loans drawn down by property type indicate that 
only 13 per cent of these loans were for new properties during 2018 and 2019Q1. 
It must be noted that these figures do not refer specifically to RIHL borrowers. 
Nevertheless, as HTB is only available to borrowers purchasing new properties, the 
DHLGH numbers on new-build drawdowns provide an indication of the maximum 
number of borrowers who could have potentially accessed both schemes 
simultaneously. This would suggest that the number of cross-overs is likely to be 
small.  
From an economic perspective, there is no reason why households facing both 
down-payment and income constraints should not be able to access both schemes 
simultaneously. Under the 10 per cent down-payment criteria of the RIHL scheme, 
gifts are allowable up to 7 per cent of the purchase price, with the remaining 
minimum 3 per cent coming from evidenced cash savings. Under the HTB scheme, 
borrowers can claim a tax rebate to the value of 5 per cent of the property price 
towards a deposit. All else being equal, a household raising 5 per cent of its deposit 
from HTB would not be expected to have a higher credit risk than a household 
raising 7 per cent of its deposit from a family gift. Allowing a crossover between 
the two schemes may, therefore, allow borrowers who do not receive gifts from 
family to access the RIHL scheme and subsequently homeownership.  
3.3 APPLICANT PROFILE, PAYMENT PREDICTABILITY AND 
AFFORDABILITY  
RIHL aims to support access to homeownership for credit-worthy low- to middle-
income FTBs who are unable to source sufficient funds elsewhere. The aims of this 
section are fourfold. First, we use microdata provided by the Housing Agency12 to 
document the characteristics of applicants to the scheme. Second, we 
demonstrate that households accessing the scheme are typically not served by the 
commercial mortgage market and highlight the need for RIHL in addressing this. 
We do this by looking specifically at the characteristics of households who received 
exemptions to the macroprudential LTI limits and compare these with the profile 
of those approved under the RIHL scheme to show how RIHL targets a different 
 
12  The Housing Agency microdata contain information on all applications sent to the Housing Agency for underwriting. 
These data were provided for all LAs with the exception of Meath and Longford. All analysis using these data in this 
report is therefore based on 29 of the 31 LAs.  
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subset of the population. Third, we discuss the predictability of payment provided 
by long-term fixed-rate loans. Finally, we analyse the expected impacts on 
affordability for borrowers accessing the RIHL scheme. 
3.3.1 Applicant profile 
One of the major challenges associated with RIHL is to ensure that it is targeted at 
the most appropriate borrowers. In this section, we explore the characteristics of 
all applicants, regardless of whether their application was successful, to assess 
where the demand for the scheme is coming from.  
FIGURE 3.6  PERCENTAGE OF SINGLE AND JOINT RIHL APPLICATIONS AND NUMBER OF DEPENDANTS 
(a) Joint v single      (b) No. of dependants  
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FIGURE 3.7 AGE DISTRIBUTION OF RIHL APPLICANTS 
 
Source: Housing Agency microdata. 
 
Just over 40 per cent of applicants are single applicants (Figure 3.6(a)), with just 
under half of applicants having no dependants, two-fifths having one or two, and 
10 per cent having three or more (Figure 3.6(b)). The average age for an applicant 
is 36. Unsurprisingly, the highest number of applications came from applicants 
aged in their 30s, but a significant number also came from those in their mid-40s 
upwards (Figure 3.7). Regarding employment status, Figure 3.8 shows 93 per cent 
of single applicants are on a permanent contract with a further 4 per cent self-
employed and 2 per cent on contract or temporary employment. Similar figures 
are evident for the primary applicant on joint applications. In addition, 65 per cent 
of the second applicants are in permanent employment, 7 per cent are self-
employed and 25 per cent not in employment.  
In terms of occupation, Figure 3.9 highlights significant differences between 
applicants in urban (€320,000 house price threshold including the greater Dublin 
area (GDA), Cork and Galway) and non-urban (€250,000 house price threshold) 
areas. In urban areas, 50 per cent of applicants are in professional or technical and 
associate professional occupations, compared to just over 30 per cent in non-urban 
areas. Traditionally, credit demand from those in professional occupations would 
have been served by the banking sector. Previous work (Corrigan et al., 2019; Allen-
Coghlan et al., 2019) shows that there are acute affordability challenges in urban 
areas, particularly in and around Dublin. The high numbers of professionals in 
urban areas accessing the scheme is likely to be a reflection of this. Instead, there 
are higher shares of applicants working in services and sales, trades, plant and 
machinery and elementary occupations in non-urban areas. These differences 
imply that there may be substantial differences in the pool of borrowers in 
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FIGURE 3.8 RIHL APPLICANT EMPLOYMENT STATUS BY NUMBER OF LOAN APPLICANTS 
 
Source: Housing Agency microdata.  
 
FIGURE 3.9 RIHL APPLICANT OCCUPATION BY €320,000 AND €250,000 HOUSE PRICE THRESHOLD AREAS  
 
Source:  Housing Agency microdata. 
Note:  For joint applicants, occupation refers to applicant 1. €320,000 house price threshold LAs in the data are: Dublin City, 
Dún Laoghaire–Rathdown, Fingal, South Dublin, Kildare, Wicklow, Louth, Cork City, Cork County, Galway City and 
Galway County. All other LAs are €250,000 house price threshold areas.  
 
Turning to income, the mean gross income of applicants to the scheme was 
€42,229. Figure 3.10(a) shows that the income distribution follows a normal 
distribution, with more than half of applicants having incomes in the range of 
€30,000–50,000. Only 12 per cent of applicants had an income greater than 
€60,000. On the other hand, a sizeable 20 per cent share of the applicants had an 
income of €30,000 or below. Figure 3.10(b) plots the distribution of applicant 
savings. These are the documented level of savings in an applicant’s savings 
account. They do not contain any potential gift an applicant may receive towards 
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a down-payment unless this has already been gifted. The mean savings amount 
was €20,587, but more than 20 per cent of applicants only had between 0 and 
€5000 in documented savings. 
FIGURE 3.10 GROSS RIHL APPLICANT INCOME AND SAVINGS DISTRIBUTIONS 
(a) Income     (b) Savings 
 
Source:  Housing Agency microdata.  
Note:  All valid applications. Savings do not necessarily include gifts: this is what has been documented in their savings 
account. Savings are not the same as deposit. 
 
3.3.2 Comparison with commercial market 
 The RIHL scheme aims to target a portion of the market currently underserved by 
the banking sector. Therefore, a critical issue in terms of ensuring the 
appropriateness of the scheme is to document the type of households using the 
scheme and ascertain whether such households are underserved by the market. 
To do this, in this section we compare some key borrower and loan characteristics 
for RIHL against those of borrowers who obtained mortgage finance from the 
banking sector. The previous section documented the characteristics of all 
applicants to the scheme. In this section we instead focus only on applications 
recommended for approval as we wish to compare those approved for mortgage 
finance in the banking sector with those approved for the RIHL scheme.  
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FIGURE 3.11  PERCENTAGE OF COMMERCIAL MARKET AND RIHL MORTGAGE LOAN APPLICATIONS BY GROSS 
INCOME BAND  
 
Source:  Income data from the CBI loan-level data (commercial market) and the Housing Agency (RIHL)). The Housing Agency 
data relate to all applications recommended for approval by the underwriters, rather than the borrowers who have 
actually received RIHL loans. CBI data are for 2018; Housing Agency RIHL data are for February 2018 to July 2019.  
 
Figure 3.11 presents a comparison of the share of RIHL approved applications and 
commercial loans issued by gross income bands using data from the Housing 
Agency and CBI. It clearly shows that commercial loans tend to serve those in the 
upper part of the income distribution, while RIHL applications are much more 
highly concentrated towards the lower end of the income distribution. Indeed, 
approximately 80 per cent of loans made in the commercial market were to 
households earning in excess of €50,000, while over 70 per cent of approved RIHL 
mortgage applications were from applicants earning €50,000 or below. While there 
is some cross-over between the two loan sectors in the middle of the income 
distribution, this is likely due to differences across geographical areas. Indeed, 
Figure 3.19 in Section 3.4 clearly shows that the distribution of RIHL applicant 
incomes for those in the urban areas (maximum house price of €320,000) is quite 
distinct from and higher than for those in non-urban areas with the lower €250,000 
house price thresholds. Figure 3.11 provides a clear indication that the RIHL 
scheme is targeted at a different segment of the population to those accessing 
loans through the banks.  
One of the suggested constraints potential borrowers face in accessing credit from 
the market is the 3.5 maximum LTI limits set under the macroprudential 
regulations. Indeed, Figure 3.12 illustrates that most RIHL borrowers exceed the 
3.5 LTI, with one-third of approvals having a requested loan-to-income ratio (ReLTI) 
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of these ratios will be discussed in Section 4.4.  
FIGURE 3.12  PERCENTAGE OF CBI MORTGAGE LOANS AND RIHL MORTGAGE LOAN APPLICATIONS BY LTI 
RATIO BAND 
 
Source:  Housing Agency and CBI.  
Note:  CBI figures refer to actual LTIs for loans drawn down in the commercial market, whereas Housing Agency figures 
refer to ReLTIs based on approved loan size for all valid applications received by the Housing Agency for underwriting 
and recommended for approval.  
 
One way in which lower- to middle-income households could potentially still access 
the homeownership market through the commercial loan sector is to be granted 
an LTI exemption. Under the current macroprudential regulations, up to 20 per 
cent of FTBs can be granted an LTI exemption by commercial banks.  
Kinghan (2018) compares both the loan and borrower characteristics of FTBs who 
received and did not receive an LTI exemption in the first half of 2018. These 
findings are reproduced below in columns 2 and 3 of Table 3.2. The first thing to 
note is that the mean income of households receiving an LTI exemption is in fact 
slightly higher than for those without an exemption, and at just under €75,000 is 
virtually at the maximum income threshold for a couple under the RIHL scheme. 
Secondly, the mean house price for those granted an exemption is €371,000, well 
above the maximum €320,000 threshold for urban areas. In part these differences 
are likely to be explained by regional variation, with Dublin accounting for a 28 per 
cent share of borrowers among those without exemptions, but a much larger 67 
per cent share of those granted an exemption. 
In column 4 of Table 3.2 we provide a comparison with RIHL applications 
recommended for approval. The estimated mean income and mean loan size for 
RIHL borrowers are approximately only 60 per cent of the levels of those currently 
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shows that RIHL is attracting more single earner households, who are particularly 
likely to face challenges entering homeownership in the commercial market. These 
figures highlight that households currently receiving exemptions from the LTI limits 
in the commercial sector tend to be relatively higher income households with 
relatively larger loan sizes. The RIHL is clearly targeting a different segment of the 
market relative to the banking sector, even those who obtain LTI allowances.  
TABLE 3.2  A COMPARISON OF CHARACTERISTICS OF FTB BORROWERS WITH AND WITHOUT LTI 
EXEMPTION 2018 H1 WITH RIHL APPLICATIONS 
Characteristic Without With RIHL  
Mean gross income (€) 72,991 74,590 44,188 
Mean loan size (€) 201,433 288,891 188,076 
Mean house price (€) 269,094 371,378 – 
Mean LTI 2.9 4.0 4.3* 
Mean interest rate (%) 3.1 3.1 2.2 
Mean loan term 29 32 27 
Mean age 35 33 36 
Joint applicants (%) 72.2 62.6 56.7 
Dublin (%) 28.2 66.6 44.6 
 
Source:  Figures taken from Kinghan (2018), Table 7.  
Note: RIHL figures refer to all approved applications. * ReLTI. RIHL house price data are not available because the Housing 
Agency microdata are application data and this field is therefore frequently incomplete and in any case does not 
refer to the actual purchase price.  
 
In summary, this section has provided clear evidence that RIHL targets a distinct 
portion of the population relative to those able to access mortgage finance through 
the banking sector, even compared with those granted an LTI exemption from the 
macroprudential regulations. This suggests that borrowers accessing the RIHL 
scheme are currently underserved by the commercial sector.  
3.3.3 Payment predictability and affordability assessment 
Payment predictability 
One of the aims of RIHL is to provide a sustainable and predictable repayment basis 
for borrowers. Regarding predictability of payment, it is helpful to draw on the 
work of Slaymaker et al. (2019), who examine the implications of interest rate rises 
on Irish households’ ability to repay their mortgages. They find that younger and 
low-income households would be most at risk of falling into arrears on their 
mortgage repayments as a result of an increase in interest rates. Drawing on this 
work, Fahy et al. (2019) note that in contrast to many other countries, in Ireland 
no loans are offered by mortgage lenders with a fixed rate for the duration of the 
mortgage term. While long-term fixed-rate loans are not suitable for all borrowers, 
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they conclude that the provision of such loans would be advantageous for those 
most at risk of falling into arrears due to rises in interest rates. In particular, at-risk 
borrowers, such as those on low incomes, would benefit from the certainty around 
their repayment levels provided by long-term fixed-rate loans.13  
FIGURE 3.13  PERCENTAGE OF APPROVED RIHL APPLICATIONS BY INTEREST RATE TYPE  
 
Source:  Housing Agency microdata.  
 
Accordingly, the fixed interest rate option for the duration of the loan provided by 
the RIHL scheme removes any concerns over future payment fluctuations by 
offering stable monthly mortgage payments across the lifetime of the loan. 
Housing Agency data for applications recommended for approval shows a roughly 
two-thirds to one-third split between the 30 year 2.25 per cent fixed rate and the 
25 year 2 per cent fixed-rate options, with only 0.2 per cent of applicants choosing 
the variable rate. In August 2019 the 2.3 per cent variable rate up to 30 year loan 
term option was removed. Given the intended target cohort and the aim to provide 
payment predictability, this decision to only offer fixed-rate products seems 
sensible.  
Affordability 
Regarding affordability, Corrigan et al. (forthcoming) compare the prospective 
mortgage payment to net income ratio with the proportion of net income currently 
spent on rent for households they determine to be eligible for RIHL. They show 
that the proportion of income spent on housing payments would fall from a mean 
of 22.4 per cent to just under 20 per cent if households were to transition from 
 
13  Similar conclusions regarding the potential benefits of long-term fixed-rate loans for the UK market are presented in 
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renting to owning under the RIHL scheme, therefore improving affordability. It is, 
however, important to note that they show that those eligible for an RIHL loan 
already have considerably lower rent to income ratios compared to those who are 
considered to have non-bankable demand, and those who are high credit risk or 
are bound by the macroprudential regulations, who pay on average nearly 28 per 
cent of their income on rent. RIHL is intended to be a small, focused scheme in the 
broader context of the overall housing market. Corrigan et al.’s findings suggest 
that households in the scheme are likely to benefit from some improvement to 
affordability, but those facing the greatest affordability challenges are likely to be 
those ineligible for RIHL who require alternative tenures.  
More generally, given the RIHL scheme parameters discussed above, it is very clear 
that the lower interest rate and ability to borrow higher multiples of income can 
provide more affordable mortgages, and increase credit access relative to funds 
available in the private market. It is also likely that, given the rent levels in many 
areas, borrowers who would otherwise have to obtain a new property in the rental 
sector would be better off under home purchase with the RIHL scheme. To 
illustrate this, we leverage the work of Allen-Coghlan et al. (2019) and calculate the 
average instalment for a typical FTB who purchases the average-priced FTB 
property in each county. We calculate this using the interest rate for the RIHL loans 
and the commercial loan market for a standard 30 year mortgage. We use the 30 
year fixed-rate comparison for the RIHL loan. We then use the FTB income levels 
estimated in Allen-Coghlan et al. (2019) to calculate an illustrative rent-to-income 
ratio, and debt-service-to-income ratio for RIHL loans and commercial loans.  
The results are presented in Table 3.3 using 2018 data. It is clear that the 
repayment for purchase is lower under RIHL relative to the market and the rental 
sector. On average across all 26 counties, the payments are approximately 20 per 
cent lower than the new market rents14 or c.€130 per month. The repayment-to-
net-income ratios are on average 4 percentage points lower for households using 
the RIHL to purchase the average FTB property relative to renting the average 
dwelling. It must be noted that this average assessment does not control 
hedonically for property types that would impact house prices and, although the 
rents are modelled hedonically, if structural differences between the rental and 
purchase sector stock are evident in some counties, this may explain some of these 
differences.  
 
14  These figures are based on RTB rental data for new market rents. Calculations by Corrigan et al. (2020) reproduced in 
Table 6 use SILC data on current rents paid. Rents reported in SILC are lower than those for new market rents 
reported by the RTB. This is unsurprising as the SILC data refer to a rental price set when that tenancy was agreed 
and there has been significant rental price inflation in recent years, meaning the prices a renter would currently face 
if they were to begin a tenancy now would be higher. While the magnitude of the effect differs according to the rent 
measure used, both measures indicate having an RIHL loan relative to paying rent should provide a significant 
improvement in affordability. 
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It is also noteworthy that in the areas with the highest house prices, it is clear that 
the borrowers would be unable to access credit without an exemption from the 
macroprudential LTI limit which does not apply to RIHL loans. The RIHL does carry 
a 35 per cent debt-service to income (DSTI) ratio limit, which is close to the 
indicative figures in Dublin and Wicklow.  
























Carlow 782 629 696 3.1 Yes 22 18 20 
Cavan 612 524 579 2.8 Yes 19 16 18 
Clare 673 645 713 3.5 Yes 21 20 22 
Cork 1009 880 973 4.1 No 28 24 27 
Donegal 565 462 511 2.8 Yes 20 16 18 
Dublin 1604 1287 1423 5.0 No 39 32 35 
Galway 983 781 863 4.3 No 32 26 28 
Kerry 694 620 685 3.2 Yes 21 19 21 
Kildare 1150 1021 1129 4.7 No 33 29 32 
Kilkenny 841 659 728 3.4 Yes 25 20 22 
Laois 795 628 695 3.4 Yes 25 20 22 
Leitrim 530 412 455 2.1 Yes 16 12 13 
Limerick 876 734 811 3.6 No 25 21 23 
Longford 573 400 443 2.2 Yes 18 13 14 
Louth 941 733 810 3.9 No 29 23 25 
Mayo 619 516 570 2.9 Yes 20 17 18 
Meath 1065 947 1048 4.6 No 32 28 31 
Monaghan 614 580 641 3.2 Yes 19 18 20 
Offaly 654 554 613 3.2 Yes 22 18 20 
Roscommon 573 459 508 2.6 Yes 19 15 17 
Sligo 698 534 590 2.7 Yes 20 15 17 
Tipperary 655 549 607 2.7 Yes 18 15 17 
Waterford 790 645 713 3.4 Yes 24 20 22 
Westmeath 730 615 680 3.2 Yes 22 19 21 
Wexford 723 627 694 3.2 Yes 21 19 21 
Wicklow 1172 1101 1217 5.3 No 35 33 36 
 
Source:  ESRI calculations.  
Note: RTB, Residential Tenancies Board. * RIHL instalment is exclusive of mortgage protection insurance (MPI) so as to be 
comparable with the commercial market instalment. Data taken from CSO house prices, Central Bank interest rates 
and ESRI/RTB rental data.  
 
While this is an illustrative example, these scenarios do not provide insight into 
whether the borrowers who have received credit under the RIHL scheme actually 
faced a reduction in their housing costs. Rather this illustration shows, in a static 
sense, how affordability could be improved in the purchase market under the RIHL 
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scheme relative to the market rents for new properties given average market 
prices. While data on households’ previous rent are recorded in the Housing 
Agency microdata, an accurate assessment of the extent to which the RIHL scheme 
has actually improved housing affordability for these households is not possible 
due to the lack of information on property characteristics. In many cases there are 
likely to be major differences between the types of property applicants rented and 
with those sought for purchase. For instance, it is not appropriate to compare the 
rent for one bedroom in a house share with the mortgage repayment for a two-
bedroom house. 
 It must be noted that households who are included in the scheme must pay an 
additional compulsory 0.5550 per cent for mortgage insurance to protect against 
income and other risks. This increases the repayment burden. We calculate the 
illustrative impact of the MPI for the different affordability scenarios in Table 7. On 
average, the increase amounts to circa €50 extra per month but this rises to 
approximately €100 in Dublin. This represents a 2 percentage point increase in the 
income ratio. It must be noted that commercial mortgage borrowers are also 
required to take out mortgage cover, with at least a life policy required. 
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TABLE 3.4  AFFORDABILITY INCLUDING MORTGAGE PAYMENT INSURANCE 
County Monthly repayment with 
MPI 




Percentage point affordability 
change 
Carlow 676.58 19 47.17 1.3 
Cavan 563.11 17 39.26 1.2 
Clare 693.02 22 48.32 1.5 
Cork 945.89 26 65.95 1.8 
Donegal 496.81 18 34.64 1.2 
Dublin 1383.22 34 96.44 2.4 
Galway 839.03 27 58.50 1.9 
Kerry 666.16 20 46.45 1.4 
Kildare 1097.05 31 76.49 2.2 
Kilkenny 708.17 21 49.38 1.5 
Laois 675.26 21 47.08 1.5 
Leitrim 442.75 13 30.87 0.9 
Limerick 788.62 22 54.99 1.6 
Longford 430.44 14 30.01 1.0 
Louth 787.54 25 54.90 1.7 
Mayo 554.52 18 38.66 1.2 
Meath 1018.28 31 71.00 2.1 
Monaghan 623.46 20 43.47 1.4 
Offaly 595.63 20 41.52 1.4 
Roscommon 493.68 16 34.42 1.1 
Sligo 573.89 17 40.01 1.2 
Tipperary 590.10 17 41.14 1.2 
Waterford 693.29 21 48.34 1.5 
Westmeath 660.92 20 46.08 1.4 
Wexford 674.45 20 47.02 1.4 
Wicklow 1183.06 35 82.48 2.4 
Overall 725.19 22 50.56 2.0 
 
Source:  ESRI calculations. Data taken from CSO house prices, CBI interest rates and ESRI/RTB rental data. 
3.4 ASSESSMENT OF PARAMETER SUITABILITY 
In this section we assess the suitability of the current parameters of the RIHL 
scheme. While the choice of parameters will always contain an element of 
policymakers’ judgement, insights into suitability can be gleaned from analysis of 
microdata. In particular, evidence of bunching or clustering at strict cut-offs, rather 
than smooth distributions, can be a sign that a particular threshold is binding. 
Similarly, clear differences in outcomes between groups with similar characteristics 
can be a sign of an unsuitable threshold. These observations must be balanced 
against the fact that changing a parameter can hugely alter the pool of scheme 
entrants and the demand for a product and may also have credit risk implications. 
All these aspects need to be considered when assessing the suitability of the 
current scheme parameters. Naturally, any scheme parameterisation, while 
informed by empirical evidence, will also be guided by the objectives of the policy 
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and policymakers’ judgement.  
In order to assess the suitability of the current scheme parameters, first, we focus 
specifically on the house price thresholds set by the scheme. Second, we look at 
the suitability of the income thresholds. Finally, we combine the two to examine 
the house prices that different income levels would allow an applicant to purchase. 
Discussion of the suitability of the age parameters of the scheme is contained in 
Section 4.2.  
3.4.1 House price limits 
One of the key features of the RIHL scheme is that the maximum value of 
properties that can be purchased under the scheme is capped with the aim of 
avoiding market distortions. House prices are capped at €320,000 for properties in 
the GDA, Cork, Galway and Louth, and €250,000 elsewhere. Previous research has 
demonstrated that in Ireland affordability challenges more generally (Corrigan et 
al., 2019), and those faced specifically by FTBs (Allen-Coghlan et al, 2019), are not 
universal, but rather acute affordability issues exist for particular groups, 
predominantly in urban areas. The benefits of a product such as RIHL will therefore 
be greatest when targeted at the urban areas with the most severe affordability 
challenges. 
Figure 3.14 reinforces the finding that affordability concerns occur in urban areas, 
particularly in and around Dublin. It presents the median FTB house prices relative 
to the RIHL house price thresholds. As RIHL is a product aimed at low- to middle-
income households, the median house price is a useful measure as it implies that 
half of FTB transactions were below this point. In fact, for non-urban LAs, those 
with a house price threshold of €250,000, we see that the median FTB house prices 
are well below these thresholds. In fact, all of these areas except Limerick had a 
median FTB house price of less than €200,000 in 2018. Currently this €250,000 
threshold appears to be quite high for non-urban areas. There is also a potential 
danger that providing significant sums of credit in areas without severe 
affordability challenges could lead to localised distortions in house prices.  
For the more urban LAs with a house price threshold of €320,000, the median 
house price is above the maximum threshold in South Dublin, Dublin City and 
considerably so for Dún Laoghaire–Rathdown (DLR). In Figure 3.14 we also use 
Property Price Register (PPR) data to plot the percentage of total property 
transactions above the RIHL thresholds. Here it is important to consider all 
transactions, not just those by FTBs, as FTBs compete for houses with second and 
subsequent buyers, as well as investors. This shows that for Dublin City, while the 
median FTB price of €350,000 is some way above the threshold, just under 40 per 
cent of all transactions took place at less than €320,000. DLR is an obvious outlier 
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with a median FTB price of €470,000 and 85 per cent of all transactions above the 
threshold.  
FIGURE 3.14  MEDIAN FTB HOUSE PRICE AND PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL TRANSACTIONS ABOVE RIHL HOUSE 




Source:  Authors’ calculations based on Central Statistics Office (CSO) median FTB house price data and PPR data. 
Notes:  Percentage of total transactions above RIHL thresholds is based on PPR data from February 2018 to August 2019. 
Median FTB house prices refer to 2018 only. We use all transactions because FTBs compete against other buyers. 
Furthermore, the PPR dataset does not contain buyer type. 
 
In the absence of access to granular house price data for RIHL borrowers, one 
additional way to examine the suitability of the scheme’s house price thresholds is 
to look at loan sizes. To do this we use two datasets: the Housing Agency 
applications microdata and the Data Gathering Initiative (DGI) LA loan drawdowns 
dataset. These DGI data contain all mortgage loans issued by LAs. As we are 
interested in the RIHL scheme, we limit our analysis to loans that were drawn down 
after 1 February 2018 with an interest rate of 2 per cent, 2.25 per cent, or 2.3 per 
cent if specified as an RIHL loan, as allowed by the scheme.15 
Figure 3.15 presents the distribution of both requested loan sizes and actual loan 
sizes drawn down for urban areas (maximum loan size of €288,000) and those for 
non-urban areas (maximum €225,000 loan size). Overall, 15 per cent of applicants 
in urban areas applied for the maximum loan size (Figure 3.15(a)). The 
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corresponding figure for non-urban areas was 5 per cent (Figure 3.15(b)). From 
Figure A.1 in Appendix I it is clear that these figures are driven by couples rather 
than single applicants. A comparison of Figure 3.15(a) and (c) shows that while 
overall in urban areas 15 per cent of applications were for the maximum loan size, 
these accounted for only 5 per cent of drawdowns. In non-urban areas only 5 per 
cent of applications and 0.5 per cent of drawdowns were for the maximum amount 
(Figure 3.15(b) and (d)). The distributions of loan size drawdowns are reproduced 
separately for the four Dublin LAs in Figure A.2 in Appendix I.16 
Figure 3.16 instead presents the percentage of applications and of drawdowns 
either at or within €10,000 of the maximum loan size split out by LA. This reveals 
substantial geographical variation, accounting for just under 30 per cent of 
applications in DLR and South Dublin, approximately 25 per cent in Fingal and 
Wicklow and just under 20 per cent in Dublin City. In terms of drawdowns, the 
figure was 20 per cent for Wicklow, 15 per cent for Dublin City and Kildare and 
below 10 per cent for both South Dublin and Fingal. There have been no 
drawdowns within €10,000 of the maximum loan size in DLR, where only nine 
drawdowns have taken place in total. Potentially the relatively small number of 
drawdowns close to the maximum limits relative to the number of requests in 
South Dublin and Fingal could indicate that the house price thresholds may be 
binding. However, the large number of drawdowns overall in Fingal, coupled with 
the fact prices are generally lower in Fingal than Dublin City, which has a similar 
level of drawdowns and requests near to the limit, would suggest this is not likely 
to be the case. Among the non-urban maximum €250,000 price areas, only 
Waterford, Kerry and Laois saw any drawdowns within €10,000 of the maximum 
loan size.  
  
 
16  There are a very small number of loans in the dataset that are above the thresholds, which we cannot identify.  
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FIGURE 3.15  REQUESTED LOAN SIZE DISTRIBUTION BY €320,000 AND €250,000 HOUSE PRICE THRESHOLD 
AREAS 
(a) 320k areas – requested    (b) 250k areas – requested 
 
(c) 320k areas – drawdowns    (d) 250k areas – drawdowns  
 
Source:  Housing Agency microdata and DGI loan level data. 
Note:  This includes all LA loans issued under 2 or 2.25 per cent interest rates, or 2.3 per cent if specifically declared as RIHL 
since 1 February 2018.  
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FIGURE 3.16  PERCENTAGE OF RIHL LOANS REQUESTED/DRAWN DOWN WITHIN €10,000 OF THRESHOLD FOR 
THAT LA 
 
Source:  Housing Agency microdata and DGI loan level data. 
Note: For areas with maximum loan size of €288,000 this means €278,000 and for those with maximum loan size of 
€225,000 this means €215,000. All valid applications.  
 
Our analysis of median FTB house prices does not find evidence that FTBs are 
unable to purchase properties at or below the current house price thresholds, with 
the exception of DLR. This is confirmed with the DGI loan level data showing there 
have been very few drawdowns in DLR (Appendix I, Figure A.2(b)). Similarly, using 
the loan level data does not suggest a need to raise these house price thresholds 
at present. These findings are supported by the Local Government Management 
Agency (LGMA) 2019Q2, data which show that the average loan size drawn down 
was €199,476 in counties where the maximum loan size is €288,000 (€215,861 in 
Dublin) and €117,228 in counties with a maximum loan size of €225,000. The 
parameters of the scheme should be monitored over time, as rapid house price 
increases could cause the current thresholds to become too low in urban areas, 
but at present there does not seem to be any evidence suggesting a need to raise 
the house price thresholds. 
3.4.2 Income limits 
The second key feature of the RIHL scheme is that maximum allowable gross 
incomes are capped at €50,000 and €75,000 for single and joint applicants 
respectively. It is important to consider whether these thresholds are set at 
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FIGURE 3.17  PERCENTAGE OF RENTAL HOUSEHOLDS BY INCOME BAND (ALL V. PRIVATE MARKET ONLY) 
 
Source:  SILC 2016 and 2017 gross household incomes grown forward to 2018 using Quarterly Economic Commentary (QEC) 
income growth estimates.  
Note: See Allen-Coghlan et al. (2019), Section 2.2, for more information on the methodology used to derive the figures.  
 
For context, Figure 3.17 presents the proportion of rental households, overall and 
just in the private rental sector, by income band using data from SILC. It shows that 
most households in the rental sector are located in the lower parts of the income 
distribution. Figure 3.18 then distinguishes between single- and multiple-adult 
households for the private rental sector. It shows that only 12 per cent of single-
adult private rental households have an income above the €50,000 threshold. For 
private rental households with at least two adults, approximately 25 per cent earn 
an income greater than the €75,000 RIHL threshold. These figures indicate that 
more than 85 per cent of single-adult households and 75 per cent of double-adult 
households in the private rental sector would meet the current income thresholds 
for the scheme. As the RIHL scheme is targeted at low- and middle-income 
households, this very broad level picture would not support an increase in the 
income thresholds. However, in practice we would at most only expect this to be 
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FIGURE 3.18  PERCENTAGE OF PRIVATE RENTER HOUSEHOLDS BY INCOME BAND 
a) Single-adult households     b) Multiple-adult households 
 
  
Source:  SILC 2016 and 2017 gross household incomes grown forward to 2018 using QEC income growth estimates.  
 
Turning specifically to RIHL applicants, Figure 3.19 clearly shows that for both single 
and joint applicants, there are distinct income distributions for households living 
in urban (€320,000 house price threshold) and non-urban (€250,000 house price 
threshold) areas, with incomes higher in urban areas. Observing a large proportion 
of borrowers with incomes at or just below the thresholds would indicate that 
these thresholds may be binding and that there may be justification to raise them. 
For single applicants, it is clear that in non-urban areas the income distribution 
follows a normal distribution with few households close to the maximum income 
threshold of €50,000. In contrast, single applicants in urban areas are heavily 
located towards the highest levels of permitted income; nearly one-fifth of 
applications were within €5000 of the €50,000 threshold. This would suggest the 
€50,000 threshold is binding for many single applicants in these urban areas.  
For joint applicants, while there is a similar pattern of incomes being higher in 
urban areas, there are many fewer applications towards the maximum income 
thresholds in urban areas relative to single applicants. Indeed, only 4 per cent of 
applications in urban areas were within €5000 of the €75,000 threshold, which 
would suggest it is not binding. That we find no evidence of a need to increase this 
€75,000 threshold is consistent with the data from the CBI on those granted LTI 
exemptions in 2018 presented in Section 3.3, which showed these households had 
a mean income of just under €75,000. This would indicate that many households 
with incomes towards the RIHL maximum joint threshold are accessing credit 
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FIGURE 3.19  RIHL APPLICANT INCOME DISTRIBUTION BY €320,000 AND €250,000 HOUSE PRICE THRESHOLD 
AREAS 
(a) Single applications       (b) Joint applications  
 
Source: Housing Agency microdata. All valid applications. 
 
While analysing the income distributions across urban and non-urban areas is 
informative, in practice we might only expect the current income thresholds to 
bind in more specific areas, particularly in and around Dublin. Table 3.5 presents 
the median incomes of both single and joint applicants, as well as the percentage 
of applications close to the income thresholds, separately for each LA. The first 
thing to note is the very small share of joint applicants within €5000 of the 
maximum income threshold, with roughly 5 per cent in Dublin City, South Dublin 
and Wicklow and 2 per cent in Fingal. On the other hand, for single applicants, a 
quarter in Dublin City, more than one-fifth in South Dublin and Wicklow and nearly 
one-third in DLR had incomes within €5000 of the maximum €50,000. This 
reinforces what we found above, suggesting that the €50,000 threshold is binding 
for many single applicants in these urban areas. 
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TABLE 3.5 MEDIAN INCOME AND PERCENTAGE APPLICATIONS CLOSE TO INCOME THRESHOLDS 
BY LA  
LA Median annual 











Carlow 34,250 17.86 39,653 5.71 
Cavan 33,000 11.11 39,845 0 
Clare 30,423 0 40,582 5.41 
Cork City 35,689 18.18 51,268 2.80 
Cork County 36,750 14.47 50,130 6.17 
Donegal 30,297 0 38,545 0 
Dublin:     
Dublin City 40,000 24.46 54,943 5.53 
DLR 42,457 31.48 55,000 1.27 
Fingal 38,070 17.79 51,984 1.99 
South Dublin 39,111 22.14 55,934 5.61 
Galway City  35,000 14.29 48,173 2.78 
Galway County 30,995 8.43 39,489 1.18 
Kerry 25,951 3.51 39,132 1.30 
Kildare 39,110 12.31 51,025 4.76 
Kilkenny 31,483 0 43,273 0 
Laois 30,003 10 40,040 0 
Leitrim 20,908 0 41,000 0 
Limerick 31,835 7.25 37,327 0 
Longford – – – – 
Louth 32,438 8.89 45,190 2.50 
Mayo 26,520 2.70 37,831 0 
Meath – – – – 
Monaghan 24,838 0 35,345 0 
Offaly 37,000 10.53 38,177 0 
Roscommon 30,400 0 37,352 0 
Sligo 26,000 12.00 40,255 2.94 
Tipperary 30,001 0 35,780 0 
Waterford 36,265 24.24 40,352 2.90 
Westmeath 37,886 12.50 32,915 0 
Wexford 29,923 7.14 40,633 0 
Wicklow 40,276 21.95 54,175 4.73 
 
Source:  Housing Agency microdata. 
 
In Section 3.3 we showed that just over one-fifth of joint applicants were in fact 
single earners owing to the second applicant not being in employment. Analysis of 
the Housing Agency microdata shows that a quarter of these applicants had an 
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income above €50,000, the limit a single applicant would face.  
An important point to consider here is whether an applicant just over these income 
thresholds, and therefore not eligible for RIHL, would be likely to be able to become 
a homeowner. We have already shown that the mean income of those receiving 
LTI exemptions from the CBI in 2018 was just under €75,000 (Table 3.2), so we 
would expect that those earning just above the €75,000 threshold are likely to be 
served by the banking sector. In contrast, a single applicant in an urban area 
earning €51,000, under a 3.5 LTI and a 90 per cent LTV, would be able to afford a 
maximum house price of roughly €200,000. This would suggest there is likely to be 
a group of single-applicant households earning above the €50,000 threshold who 
are unable to access mortgage credit, in comparison to those on lower incomes 
who are able to become homeowners through the RIHL scheme. Given this, and 
the evidence that the income thresholds appear to be binding for many single 
applicants in urban areas, it would be recommended to review the level of the limit 
on single-income households in urban areas. Options to address this could be to 
raise the limit, or to remove the lower-income thresholds for single applicants and 
to apply a uniform income threshold of €75,000 in urban areas. However, it is 
important to note that such a change cannot be considered in isolation. Any change 
to the income threshold for single applicants could notably change the scope of 
the policy for this group and should be cognisant of income limits for other social 
and affordable housing policies.  
3.4.3 Looking jointly at house price and income limits 
Unlike the house price thresholds, which differ depending on the geographical 
location of the property, the maximum income thresholds for the RIHL scheme are 
the same regardless of location. One issue with this is that house prices differ 
substantially across the country. To illustrate this point, it is useful to think in terms 
of what amount a particular income allows a household to borrow. In the 
commercial sector under macroprudential LTI limits of 3.5, a couple earning 
€75,000 could expect to borrow a maximum of €262,500, which is considerably 
greater than the maximum loan amount of €225,000 available in non-urban areas, 
and even greater than the median FTB house prices in all these non-urban LAs 
(Figure 3.14). In this context, both the income and house price limits would appear 
to be high for the non-urban LAs, so we would not expect households to be able to 
reach these thresholds in these areas. In theory, the condition requiring evidence 
of having been rejected by two mortgage lenders should prevent borrowers who 
could access mortgage finance from a bank from doing so through the RIHL 
scheme. In practice, it could be a concern that some borrowers at the upper end 
of the allowable income distribution in non-urban areas could use RIHL as a way to 
borrow larger amounts than they would be permitted to in the commercial market. 
This should be considered during the assessment process. 
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To look further at the suitability of the current income and house price thresholds, 
it is informative to consider the maximum house price each applicant’s income 
would permit them to buy under the current market credit conditions of a 3.5 LTI 
and a 90 per cent LTV. This then allows us to create a hypothetical house price 
distribution for RIHL applicants and compare it to the actual house price 
distribution from the PPR data. If the distributions of house prices RIHL applicants 
should currently be able to purchase through accessing credit from the banking 
sector and the actual house price distribution are similar, this would imply that the 
current parameters of the scheme may be too high. We do this separately for the 
€320,000 (Figure 3.20(b)) and €250,000 maximum house price threshold areas 
(Figure 3.20(a)). 
Figure 3.20(a) shows a significant overlap between this hypothetical and the actual 
house price distribution in non-urban areas. This implies that given the current 
scheme parameters, most of the current pool of applicants in non-urban areas 
would be expected to be able to access credit from the market. This is not to say 
that all of these households would necessarily receive credit through the banking 
sector in practice. It also does not indicate that there is no requirement for RIHL in 
these non-urban areas, but it does suggest that many of the current applicants in 
these areas are unlikely to really need the RIHL product in order to become a 
homeowner.  
Figure 3.20 does highlight that the vast majority of the need for this product occurs 
in urban areas. From Figure 3.20(b) we see that the two distributions are fairly 
distinct. This reinforces the finding of Allen-Coghlan et al. (2019) that severe 
affordability pressures for FTBs are very much an urban rather than a nationwide 
issue. The benefits of a product like RIHL will therefore be greatest when targeted 
at the urban areas with the most severe affordability challenges. 
Figure 3.20 demonstrates that the current house price threshold of €250,000 in 
non-urban areas is indeed too high as it includes nearly 90 per cent of all properties 
sold in these areas. In contrast, households in urban areas with a maximum 
permitted house price of €320,000 can only access 60 per cent of all properties 
sold. Allowing households in non-urban areas to access a similar 60 per cent of the 
house price distribution would mean reducing the maximum price threshold for 
these areas to approximately €165,000–170,000. This is not to say that 60 per cent 
is the appropriate benchmark, but merely to illustrate a comparative figure for the 
€320,000 in urban areas. In practice, there is considerable variation in house prices 
between these non-urban areas. For instance, from Figure 23 we see that median 
FTB prices in these areas ranged from €210,000 in Limerick down to €110,000 in 
Longford. Consideration could be given to further splitting these non-urban areas, 
for instance by separating the most rural areas with the lowest prices into a third 
group with lower maximum house price thresholds. 
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More generally, the median FTB house price for each LA could provide a useful 
benchmark when deciding where to set maximum house price thresholds as 50 per 
cent of the transactions have occurred below this point. However, policymakers 
should be cognisant that the introduction of county-specific limits adds 
considerable complexity to the scheme and may have distortive policy effects in 
terms of scheme access but also may affect the spatial pattern of demand. Given 
these considerations, it may be more efficient to include a single third tier. For 
example, setting a third tier at c.€150k–€170k for areas with very low house prices 
relative to the current limit could be considered. 
As the hypothetical house price calculated in Figure 3.20 is based on what 
applicants could afford given their income, as well as current market credit 
conditions, it also indicates that the current income thresholds are too high in the 
non-urban areas. Lowering the income thresholds in non-urban areas could be 
considered.  
In summary, from our analysis of house price and income threshold suitability, we 
draw the following conclusions. At present, we find no evidence of a need to raise 
house price thresholds. In fact, in non-urban areas we show that the current 
€250,000 limit is too high and should be lowered.  
For incomes, we find no evidence of a need to raise the maximum €75,000 
threshold for joint applicants. Households at or above these income levels appear 
to be receiving credit through the banking sector, either in line with the 
macroprudential regulations or through receiving an LTI exemption. For single 
applicants there is evidence that the €50,000 threshold is binding in urban areas. 
Consideration should be given to revising this limit. Options could include raising 
the limit, or removing the lower-income thresholds for single applicants. 
Policymakers should be cognisant of the consistency of any changes relative to 
income limits for other social and affordable housing schemes. As with the house 
price limits, in non-urban areas, the income limits may be too high as evidenced by 
the fact that the RIHL applicant households would be able to borrow sufficiently to 
purchase at the market transacted prices under the 3.5 LTI limit set by regulations 
(see Figure 3.20(a)).  
The parameters of the scheme should be monitored over time, as rapid house price 
increases could cause both the current house price and income thresholds to 
become too low, particularly in urban areas.  
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FIGURE 3.20  HYPOTHETICAL RIHL V. ACTUAL PPR HOUSE PRICE DISTRIBUTIONS – €320,000 V. €250,000 
AREAS 
(a) 250k areas 
 
(b)  320k areas  
 
Source: Housing Agency microdata and PPR. 
Note:  Hypothetical RIHL is the house price each RIHL applicant could hypothetically afford given their income and a 3.5 LTI 
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3.5 CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS 
A number of findings emerge from this chapter. The main considerations are as 
follows. 
Mortgage demand 
• Microsimulation research shows there is a considerable unmet underlying demand for 
mortgage credit in the Irish FTB market, which could be met under prudent credit risk 
assessment. 
• The most common reason households are unable to access credit is having an insufficient 
down-payment. Many of those who overcome this are then restricted in how much they 
can borrow by their income. 
• This implies a role for both equity and income supports (for example, a combination of 
help-to-buy-type instruments with a dedicated public mortgage provision). A cross-over 
between these two policies should be allowable in cases where borrowers face income 
and down-payment constraints. 
Role for RIHL 
• At present there is a clear role for RIHL in alleviating a portion of the current unmet 
demand for mortgage credit. It is estimated that RIHL could provide a minimum of 1000 
loans valued at €200m per annum. 
Targeting of scheme, payment predictability and affordability 
• Mortgage lending by the banking sector is concentrated at the higher end of the income 
distribution, while RIHL offers credit to households in lower parts of the distribution. 
• Since the start of the RIHL scheme, 80 per cent of loans made in the commercial market 
were to households earning in excess of €50,000, while 70 per cent of RIHL mortgages 
were to households earning €50,000 or below. 
• Previous research finds low-income, younger households are most at risk of falling into 
arrears on their mortgages when interest rates rise. Mortgages with a fixed term for the 
duration of the loan are therefore a welcome addition to the market, as they should 
provide predictability for households unable to cope with fluctuations in payments. The 
decision to remove the variable rate option in August 2019 was sensible, as it would not 
have provided this stability. 
• RIHL would be expected to improve affordability relative to new tenancies in the private 
rental market or under commercial mortgages, provided it is well targeted. 
Parameter suitability 
• Median FTB house prices are well below €250,000 in all LAs with this house price limit. In 
areas with the higher €320,000 limit, median FTB prices were only higher than the limit 
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in DLR, in Dublin City and (slightly) in South Dublin. In all areas except DLR, at least 40 per 
cent of all housing transactions took place below these thresholds. 
• At present, we find no evidence of a need to raise house price thresholds and maintain 
consistency with the objectives of a targeted instrument that lends to low- and middle-
income households. In fact, in non-urban areas we argue that the current €250,000 limit 
is too high and should be lowered considerably. A three-tier system could be used that 
would provide a considerably lower cap for counties with the lowest house prices. 
• For incomes, we find no evidence of a need to raise the maximum €75,000 threshold for 
joint applicants. Households at or above these income levels appear to be receiving credit 
through the banking sector, either in line with the macroprudential regulations or 
through receiving an LTI exemption. There is evidence that the income cap for single 
applicants is binding in urban areas. Options include raising the cap for single households 
or removing the lower income threshold and having a common €75,000 upper limit on 
all incomes. These changes can be considered in the context of income limits for other 
social and affordable housing schemes for consistency purposes. As with the house price 
limits, in non-urban areas, the income limits appear high and could be lowered. 
• The parameters of the scheme should be monitored over time, as rapid house price 
increases could cause both the current house price and income thresholds to become 
unsuitable.  




Credit policy and credit risk assessment 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Critical to the effectiveness, suitability and sustainability of the scheme is the credit 
risk assessment done on potential borrowers as well as the broad parameters of 
the credit policy. Managing credit risk at the point of loan origination is a 
multifaceted task, which combines strict evaluation of borrower risk through 
appropriate credit assessment with ensuring sufficient buffers in terms of equity 
to reduce expected losses in the case of default.17 
International evidence, and recent research for Ireland, highlights a number of key 
catalysts that drive mortgage default. These include labour market shocks 
(unemployment or income falls), which limit repayment capacity (Gerardi et al., 
2017; McCarthy, 2014), interest rate rises that stress payments (Slaymaker et al., 
2019), equity shocks (falls in house prices) and changes in personal circumstances 
such as divorce or poor health.18 Considerable importance has also been given to 
the incidence of simultaneous equity and affordability shocks, which magnify the 
default risk.19 
The decisive factor as to how such shocks translate into arrears cases is the 
absorptive capacity of the household. The employment status, level of income, 
spending patterns, and indebtedness all play a role in determining credit risk. For 
example, it has been found that lower-income households have fewer spare 
resources left after housing cost (Corrigan et al., 2019) and this makes them 
vulnerable to changes in their economic circumstances. Indeed, Slaymaker et al. 
(2019) show that lower-income households are more sensitive to interest rate 
hikes in terms of default risk.  
While managing credit risks at origination through an appropriate credit policy is 
complex, there are some critical indicators that highlight the level of vulnerability 
in the portfolio. These include the repayment-to-income ratio, the loan-to-income 
(LTI) ratio and the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio. Therefore, from a credit risk 
 
17  O’Malley (2018) found strategic default to have occurred in Ireland when repossession risk was removed. This is 
critically important in the context of local authority (LA) lending.  
18  Fahy et al. (2018) show that the balance of these factors changes over time, with adverse personal circumstances 
more important during periods of relative economic buoyancy.  
19  This issue is commonly known as the double trigger. See Slaymaker et al. (2019) for further discussion and 
references.  
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assessment perspective, it is critical to understand the extent to which the credit 
policy limits risks relating to the aforementioned issues.  
The objectives of this chapter are threefold. First, we explore the high-level 
parameters of the credit policy and assess their appropriateness in limiting risks. 
Second, we use data on the existing lending to explore the actual credit risk profile 
of existing lending. Finally, we explore other selected credit risk considerations. 
It must be noted that this review of the credit policy and credit risk is undertaken 
from an economic perspective. Please note that the report is not an audit of 
compliance with regard to the credit policy, nor does it provide any insight into 
legal or governance issues that are associated with credit allocation. Rather it 
focuses on the management of the economic factors that lead to credit default and 
how these can be minimised.  
4.2 CURRENT CREDIT POLICY AND RISK ASSESSMENT PROCESS 
The current credit policy for the Rebuilding Ireland Home Loan (RIHL) scheme is set 
out in the credit policy 201820 in line with the parameters provided in the Housing 
(Rebuilding Ireland Home Loans) Regulations 2018 (S.I. No. 25 of 2018). The credit 
policy also notes its compliance with the Housing (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 
1992 and the Consumer Credit Act 1995. The key criteria of the credit policy are 
listed in Table 4.1. While a complete review of all the operational specifics is 
outside the scope of this research (requiring legal and other considerations), we 
present some reflections on the criteria in line with whether they heighten or 
lessen the risk of a credit default. We discuss these conditions bunched into the 
two aforementioned groups of (a) loan conditions and (b) repayment capacity. We 
first discuss a key entry condition of insufficient finance offers.  
  
 
20  Internal DHLGH document. 
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TABLE 4.1 RIHL CREDIT POLICY CONDITIONS AND CRITERIA   
Credit policy conditions Criteria 
Evidence of insufficient finance from two financial institutions Scheme entry 
The maximum LTV ratio is 90 per cent Loan 
conditions 
The maximum value of the property to be purchased cannot exceed regulatory 
limits. These are currently set at €320,000 for Cork, Dublin, Galway, Kildare, 
Louth, Meath and Wicklow, and €250,000 in other counties 
Loan 
conditions 
The maximum borrowing limits are €288,000 in Counties Cork, Dublin, Galway, 
Kildare, Meath and Wicklow, and €225,000 elsewhere 
Loan 
conditions 




Loan terms are set at a maximum of 30 years, up to the age of 70 years Loan 
conditions 
Mortgage protection insurance is required Loan 
conditions 
Fixed- and variable-rate loans will be advanced based on the capacity to repay 
using net income ratio calculations 
Repayment 
capacity 
Repayments should be limited to 35 per cent of after-tax disposable income 




Variable rate loan repayments should be calculated with a 2 per cent increase 
on the interest rate 
Repayment 
capacity 




Applications must have a credible savings record of a minimum of 12 months’ 
duration immediately prior to making the application 
Repayment 
capacity 
Applicants must consent to an Irish Credit Bureau/Credit Register check and be 
of good credit standing with a satisfactory credit record 
Repayment 
capacity 
A judgement search must be undertaken Repayment 
capacity 
Primary earner on the application must have at least 2 years’ continuous 




Source:  DHLGH RIHL documentation. 
 
It should be noted that the current evaluation of credit risk focuses more on an 
assessment of repayment capacity and housing equity from an economic 
perspective. For example, the credit policy incorporates a range of measures 
including valuations and that the property should be in good condition and of good 
marketable title. These factors would affect the expected losses in the case of 
default, but ensuring these are enforced, along with other legal issues, is outside 
the scope of this report. 
4.2.1 Scheme entry and insufficient finance offers 
It has been a long-standing element of LA mortgage credit access that borrowers 
must receive at least two rejections from banks. This is a critical element to ensure 
that the scheme is not interfering with the broader market and that the borrowers 
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are actually credit constrained. This condition is all the more important for the 
current scheme given that the interest rates are lower than the current market 
prices and at longer (potentially more favourable) lending terms.  
For the RIHL scheme, it has been noted in discussions with stakeholders conducted 
as part of the review that it has become difficult for borrowers to obtain formal 
rejection letters. As alternatives, online calculator figures have been accepted for 
the RIHL scheme as proof of insufficient finance. Such a policy does require 
additional policing to ensure the scheme is targeted at borrowers most in need. 
Indeed, feedback has been received from an LA that it is unclear why its applicants 
to its scheme are unable to get funds through the banks. It feels it is not acting as 
lender of last resort and is competing with the banks. In the €250,000 house price 
areas, our illustrative analysis above (Figure 3.20) shows that most borrowers 
would appear to be able to borrow commercially at less than 3.5 times incomes. 
This highlights the importance of policing the insufficient offers.  
Of critical importance is that the income, house purchase value and implied deposit 
are cross-checked between the application form for RIHL and the online 
calculators. The borrowing amount on the calculator should then be checked vis-
à-vis the application form. It can be seen from the two online calculators for Bank 
of Ireland and AIB contained in Appendix II that the personal characteristics, house 
price and lending amount are provided and can be used in the check. If the loan 
amount they can get, for the same house price and personal income, is lower in 
the RIHL application than in the market one, then the insufficient finance condition 
will not be passed. At this stage their particulars may need to be re-entered in a 
commercial bank’s calculator to ensure that finance is insufficient if the borrower 
has not provided sufficient evidence. Indeed, this check could be done on all 
applications, even if formal rejections are provided. At present the LA is required 
to check that the borrowing amount and all other input details on the market 
lender’s online calculator are consistent with the RIHL application submitted, 
before sending to the Housing Agency. We would suggest that this be conducted 
also by the Housing Agency, separately and independently of the LAs. 
These checks between the application form and the online calculator are 
particularly important in non-urban areas without acute affordability concerns. In 
consultations with stakeholders conducted as part of this review, concerns were 
raised over applicants applying to banks for larger loan sizes simply to get the 
required rejection and then requesting a smaller loan amount under the RIHL 
scheme. Additional concerns were raised over applicants applying to the banking 
sector with no mention of a gift towards a down-payment, but then including a gift 
in their RIHL application. The down-payment amount on the online mortgage 
calculator should be checked to ensure it is the same as on the RIHL application.  
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Another potential source of cross-checking for two rejected or insufficient 
applications will be the Central Credit Registry, which will hold evidence of 
applications. This would provide each borrower with an application footprint that 
could be checked. It is envisaged that the Credit Registry will be used by the LAs 
going forward. Where borrowers do not have any mortgages outstanding and have 
two applications on the credit registry, this could be used to inform the insufficient 
finance condition. The check on the borrowing amount as above should still be 
completed. One LA indicated that it will begin to use the Credit Registry to follow 
rejections in the future.  
One suggestion from the consultations is that a formal engagement process could 
be set up with the local bank managers to consider the issues of rejections. This 
would allow LAs to gain more local market knowledge and better understand 
whether the scheme was targeting the correct borrowers, given it would be in the 
bank’s interests to provide a loan if it can. While it may be difficult to operationalise 
such a rule on an LA level given the national nature of the policy, incorporating 
information sharing between the scheme participants and the market providers 
could be beneficial. Such an engagement could take the form of simple information 
sharing, or a referral process (similar to the mechanism used for the small to 
medium-sized enterprise (SME) credit guarantee scheme, whose participants are 
referred from the commercial banks when they have insufficient collateral).  
4.2.2 Loan conditions 
LTV restriction and equity contribution 
The LTV ratio is a critical driver of mortgage default, as households with negative 
equity have a higher likelihood of missing payments. Furthermore, having equity 
in the asset value relative to the debt level also provides to keep the loss given 
default (LGD) manageable and lower the expected portfolio losses.  
Ensuring that households provide a sufficient equity buffer therefore provides a 
safeguard in the event of a house price downturn. RIHL sets the LTV ratio at 90 per 
cent. This is a tighter limit than was set by previous LA lending schemes (Table 4.2) 
and the restriction is now in line with the Central Bank of Ireland’s (CBI) limits under 
the macroprudential restrictions on the mortgage market. The 90 per cent limit set 
by the CBI is in line with international norms (Kelly et al., 2015). Furthermore, 
research by Kelly et al. (2015) show that first-time buyer (FTB) default probabilities 
increase considerably after an origination LTV of 90 per cent, which provides 
empirical evidence for the calibration of the indicator in this region. Bringing the 
RIHL LTV to 90 per cent is therefore a positive step and should be maintained in 
any future loan schemes. 
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RIHL CBI FTB limit 
97% 92% 90% 90% 
 
Source: DHLGH documentation; CBI.  
 
The credit policy outlines the composition of the applicant equity that contributes 
to the 10 per cent. While gifts are allowable up to 7 per cent of the purchase price, 
cash savings, demonstrated by written proof, must make up the final 3 per cent. A 
savings share is important as it demonstrates good financial planning and 
management. International research has found that borrowers funding even 
modest down-payments from their own resources have substantially lower default 
rates (Kelly, 2008). In the policy, the final statement in Section 2.1 allows 
exemptions from this 3 per cent savings share. Exemptions from the savings share 
heighten risk, and this clause should not be used extensively.  
Other loan conditions 
The other key loan conditions of importance for underwriting are contained in 
Table 4.3 and are compared with the two previous LA schemes. In terms of the 
income limits and the maximum loan criteria, Chapter 3 discusses the current 
suitability of these thresholds. Given the requirement to have a 90 per cent LTV, 
the maximum loans are in a sense a residual given the house price limits and LTV. 
One feature of the RIHL scheme relative to previous LA schemes is the lack of a 
specific minimum income limit. As lower-income households have fewer buffers 
and residual income left after housing costs (Corrigan et al., 2019), it is likely that 
removing a minimum income does heighten risk. Nevertheless, a stable income, 
however low, if matched with an appropriate payment, could be low credit risk. 
The critical issue is, therefore, the assessment of repayment capacity.  
One final reflection in relation to these parameters relates to the age limits, which 
are set between 18 and 70. Setting the maximum age above the normal retirement 
age could be risky given that median income replacement rates following 
retirement are 50 per cent of earned income (Nivakoski and Barrett, 2017). Many 
commercial lenders set the cut-off for the end of the mortgage term at 65 
(therefore the term is set at a maximum of 30 years or 65 minus current age). LAs 
consulted as part of this review indicated they would like to lower the maximum 
age at the end of the term to 67 to correspond to the national retirement rate. 
However, given inflation in incomes over the horizon of the mortgage, the risk of 
facing default in the later years is very low. Nevertheless, it might be prudent to 
align the scheme end age to the statutory pension age limit.  
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TABLE 4.3 CRITERIA BY LA LOAN SCHEME  
Criterion Standard LA annuity loan Home Choice loan RIHL 
Income limit – single  <€50k >€35k  <€50k 
Income limit – joint  <€75k >€45k <€75k 
Age 18–70 18–70 18–70 
Maximum loan €220,000 €285,000 €288,000 or 
€225,000 
Maximum term 30 years* 30 years* 30 years 
 
Source:  DHLGH documentation; Central Bank of Ireland.  
Note:  * LAs had some discretion around the maximum lending term for the products.  
 
4.2.3 Repayment capacity 
Understanding the appropriateness of the credit policy in providing guidance to 
measure repayment capacity is linked to the assessment of income, repayment 
capacity and good financial standing as outlined in Sections 2, 3 and 4 of the policy. 
While there is considerable detail in these sections, we will focus here on a limited 
number of the indicators of most relevance to the economic determinants of credit 
default.  
Employment status restrictions 
Assessing income and borrowing capacity is critical to ensuring good credit 
assessment. Labour market shocks have been found to be a strong driver of 
mortgage default and therefore managing these risks at origination is critical. The 
first criterion of importance is an assessment of length of employment or self-
employment (2 years continuous regardless of employment type). Ensuring 
borrowers have proper employment (or a history of self-employment) is critical to 
ensuring such households are a credit-worthy borrower. This condition is in line 
with market norms and should be maintained. One aspect that could well be 
adjusted relates to contract income, where the contract has less than 3 months 
left. This condition applies if a borrower has been provided a commitment from an 
employer to renew the contract. This clause should ensure that such a 
commitment is received in writing.  
Net income ratio limits  
There is no maximum LTI limit in the RIHL scheme as is the case for commercial 
loans under the macroprudential framework. Instead, the loans set a maximum 
repayment burden or debt service to income (DSTI) ratio of 35 per cent of net 
income. This maximum is specified in the credit policy to fall for lower-income 
households and differ between joint and single-borrower applications. The 
schedule can be found in the credit policy document. Importantly, the repayment 
burden includes all debts, not just the proposed mortgage repayment. There are 
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exemptions from the 35 per cent rule whereby flexibility can be provided up to 40 
per cent DSTI in up to 10 per cent of cases per annum.  
The credit policy also provides for a graduated reduction in the maximum allowable 
income limit for lower-income households. This is set out in Table 4.4.  
TABLE 4.4 MAXIMUM RIHL ALLOWABLE NET INCOME RATIO (DSTI) BY GROSS INCOME   
Gross income (€) Maximum ratio (%)  
Single Joint 
25,000–30,999 30 n/a 
31,000–34,999 31 n/a 
35,000–39,999 32 30 
40,000–44,999 33 31 
45,000–49,999 34 32 
50,000–54,999 35* 33 
55,000–59,999 n/a 34 
60,000–75,000 n/a 35 
 
Source:  DHLGH credit policy documentation. 
Note: * Only a single applicant earning exactly €50,000 is eligible in this band.  
 
The graduated reduction is prudent and would be consistent with research 
evidence by Corrigan et al. (2019) that lower-income households have few 
resources available after housing costs, even at a low net income ratio (DSTI).  
Of critical importance for this review is the extent to which the 35 per cent DSTI is 
suitably parameterised for the pool of borrowers accessing the RIHL scheme. To 
consider this issue, we look to international evidence to consider what other 
countries set when they use this rule.  
A number of countries use these explicit DSTI limits in their macroprudential 
frameworks (see Table 4.5). The National Bank of Romania has set the DSTI ratio 
at 35 per cent of net income to manage risks on its lending activity. Table 4.5 lists 
the full range of other European countries that rely on DSTI limits, in addition to 
LTV limits, to manage macroprudential risks. Nier et al. (2019) note that these 
measures have also been a long-standing feature of the macroprudential regimes 
used in Asia.  
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TABLE 4.5 COUNTRIES USING DSTI LIMITS IN EUROPE AND THE PARAMETER CALIBRATION   
Country Regulator Year Calibration 
Cyprus Central Bank 
of Cyprus 
2013 The debt servicing amount shall be limited to either (a) 35% of the borrower's 
‘total monthly income’ or (b) the difference between the ‘total monthly income’ 
and the ‘total monthly expenditure’, whichever is lower.  
For high-income borrowers, the debt servicing amount may exceed the above limit 
of 35%. This limit shall in any case not exceed the lower of (a) 60% of the 
borrower’s total monthly income or (b) the difference between the ‘total monthly 





2018 Recommendation: upper limit for the DSTI ratio of 45% (of the applicant's net 
annual income). This may be exceeded for 5% of the total amount of retail loans 
secured by residential property, in justifiable cases, i.e. a high probability of a loan 
repayment is identified. 
Estonia Eesti Pank 2014 All credit institutions operating in Estonia are subject to a DSTI limit of not more 
than 50% of borrower’s net income for new housing loans. Up to 15% of the 
amount of new housing loans issued in a quarter are allowed to breach the limit(s).  
Hungary Magyar 
Nemzeti Bank 
2018 Payment-to-income (PTI) ratio limits are amended, and now range from 25% to 
60% during the phase-in period (1 October 2018–30 June 2019). 
Lithuania Lietuvos 
bankas 
2011 DSTI of not more than 40% of borrower’s net income. 
Lithuania Lietuvos 
bankas 
2015 Amendments of previously introduced measure: introduction of stress DSTI limit of 
50% (alongside the usual 40% limit) with the 5 per cent interest rate used in the 
stress testing. A credit institution can apply a DSTI of more than 40% of the 
borrower's income, but overall capped at 60%, for the amount of housing loans 
that is not higher than 5% of the total value of new housing loans granted by that 
credit institution during the calendar year. 
Portugal Banco de 
Portugal 
2018 DSTI limit 50%, with the following exceptions: 
• up to 20% of the total amount of credit granted under this measure by each 
institution in each year may be granted to borrowers with a DSTI of up to 
60%; 
• up to 5% of the total amount of credit granted under this measure by each 




2011 In the case of consumer loans, when establishing the maximum level of DSTI, the 
credit institutions must take into account the foreign currency risk, interest rate 
risk and income risk. The values for these risk factors are explicitly specified in the 
regulation: (a) for foreign currency risk, the depreciation scenarios of the local 
currency to be incorporated are 35.5% for EUR denominated loans, 52.6% for CHF 
denominated loans and 40.9% for USD denominated loans, (b) for interest rate risk 
0.6 percentage points increase in interest rate and (c) for income risk, 6% 





2018 Implementation of a limit of 40% on DSTI, as measured by the ratio of total 




2016 Tightening of the limit on DSTI ratio for housing loans. Loan instalments (for both 
new and existing loans, subject to assumed interest rate increase by 2 percentage 
points, if interest rate is not fixed) cannot exceed 80% of borrower’s disposable 
income.  
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Country Regulator Year Calibration 
Slovenia Banka 
Slovenije  
2016 The recommended maximum level of the DSTI ratio is: (a) for borrowers with 
monthly income less than or equal to EUR 1700: 50%; and (b) for borrowers with 
monthly income exceeding EUR 1700: 50% for that portion of income up to EUR 
1700 inclusive, and 67% for that portion of income exceeding EUR 1700. In the 
event of several borrowers, this provision applies to each borrower separately. 
 
Source:  ESRB Macroprudential database. 
Note:  EUR, euro; CHF, Swiss franc; USD, US dollar. 
 
Given the international comparisons in Table 4.5, the RIHL calibration for the DSTI 
does not appear to be out of line with the international evidence. Two further 
considerations must be noted at this juncture. The above limits are set for the 
commercial market as a whole in many cases, whereas the RIHL is targeted at a 
specific group of constrained households who are lower income. Lower-income 
households are likely to default more and therefore the RIHL pool is likely to be of 
higher credit risk. This would suggest that a tighter limit than for the market as a 
whole would be required. The fact that the RIHL credit policy lowers the DSTI limit 
as income falls appears consistent with this and is a prudent feature.  
Another source of vulnerability would be if the whole portfolio was receiving credit 
at or close to the 35 per cent DSTI limit. This would indicate a concentration of 
lending at high DSTIs and would heighten the portfolio risk. We will explore this in 
Section 4.4.  
As we noted earlier, exemptions to the policy can be provided where the 
application falls outside the criteria in the following categories. 
• Net income ratio is >35 and <40 per cent and limited to 10 per cent of cases on an annual 
basis (subject to exceptional circumstances that can be justified and documented). 
• Income is outside that allowable in Section 4.2 of the credit policy document. 
• Income in the case of a separation.  
In these cases, the credit committee can go beyond the allowable limits without 
recourse to the underwriter. The provision of allowable exemptions is not without 
precedent. A number of the international macroprudential frameworks provide a 
system of proportionate caps or ‘speed limits’ to breach the maximum allowable 
numerical limit. For example, in Ireland exemptions can be granted to the 90 per 
cent LTV limit in cases amounting to 5 per cent of the balance of lending, while 20 
per cent of the balance of FTB lending can breach the 3.5 times income ratio. In 
Credit policy and credit risk assessment | 65 
 
 
the UK, the LTI ratio can also breach the 4.5 ratio in 15 per cent of cases, while such 
an instrument is also available under the regulatory framework in New Zealand.21 
The motivation for these allowances is to minimise distortions from the policies, 
for example in cases where households have a good repayment capacity but do 
not have sufficient down-payment or alternatively have high equity but cannot 
borrow sufficiently (Cassidy and Hallissey, 2016). Cassidy and Hallissey (2016) also 
note that such exemptions allow flexibility, whereas otherwise a regulator may be 
preventing borrower types or specific products in their entirety.  
However, given that the pool of RIHL borrowers is likely higher risk and it is already 
a niche scheme, the rationale for such exemptions in the context of the RIHL is less 
clear. It would be better to restrict such allowances further. Data on the receipt of 
these allowances should be collected centrally and the borrower profile analysed 
and monitored as is conducted for the commercial market (Kinghan and McCann, 
2019).  
While the imposition of a DSTI ratio as a prudential filter is critical to ensure good 
credit risk management for this scheme, it may not alone be a sufficient safeguard 
for low income households. For example, many households, with income below 
€30,000 could actually have a 30 per cent DSTI but have insufficient funds left to 
cover a basic standard of living. A simple illustration of the potential indebtedness 
of low-income households is as follows. Figure 4.1 shows that the implicit LTI ratio 
(for the 30 year fixed-rate option) which is suggested by the DSTI restriction could 
go as high as 5.7 for low-income borrowers22 (this does not mean that the 
borrowers would actually qualify for loans of this size as other factors may 
eliminate them from the credit assessment). Furthermore, research shows that, 
even at low DSTI, low-income households have few resources left after housing 
cost to purchase a normal basket of goods and services (Corrigan et al., 2019). It 
may therefore be prudent to introduce additional measures to limit indebtedness 
and ensure repayment capacity for low-income households. One channel that 
could be used would be to raise the interest rate. This would tighten the current 
DSTI limits by increasing the payment for a given term and loan balance. This in 
itself would be an additional safeguard and help boost the credit-absorptive 
capacity. We return to this issue in Chapter 5.  
 
21  See the Bank of England or Reserve Bank of New Zealand websites for more information on their mortgage lending 
limits.  
22  The authors can provide calculations on request. The analysis follows the steps on page 13 of the credit policy using 
the 30 year fixed-rate product as an example. However, in discussions with the Housing Agency, it was noted that in 
determining the borrowing capacity, the MPI payment is reduced from the total loan size by adjusting down the 
monthly repayment capacity by the value of the MPI payment and then the loan size is recalculated. While this is a 
prudent measure in terms of assessing borrowing capacity, it is not documented in the credit policy. This should be 
addressed and this step included in any revised credit policy. 
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Additionally, if further measures were to be imposed, these could include explicitly 
specifying a minimum income level, residual income (after mortgage payment) 
test, or income multiple restriction on borrowing. Further research would be 
required as to the efficacy and calibration of these options.  
FIGURE 4.1 IMPLIED LTI MAXIMUM BASED ON GROSS INCOME AND NET INCOME ALLOWABLE  
 
Source:  ESRI calculations.  
Note:  Figures consistent with ESRI calculations using original credit policy. Adjustments may be in place that have updated 
this. The numbers are illustrative only and do not imply that borrowers on these incomes would be provided with 
these credit terms. Analysis follows Step 4 on p. 12 of credit policy but includes mortgage protection insurance (MPI).  
Other indicators 
In terms of prohibited categories, for households who had rent arrears, there is an 
exemption for satisfactory explanations. This would appear to be broad and a 
clarification should be provided as to what is a satisfactory explanation. All other 
prohibitions would appear suitable.23  
4.3 UNDERWRITING DECISIONS AND THE CREDIT COMMITTEE 
OUTCOMES 
RIHL applications are received by LAs and then passed on to the Housing Agency, 
which performs the main credit assessment. This section provides an overview of 
 
23  The groups referred to are: applicant(s) who are the subject of legal action for debt recovery; applicant(s) who have 
been involved in a previous settlement that has resulted in a loss to a financial institution; applicant(s) who are 
declared bankrupt or currently subject to bankruptcy proceedings; and applicant(s) who have a court order 
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the underwriting rejection rates and reasons for rejections. This is critical to 
assessing the borrower screening. Using the Housing Agency microdata, we are 
then able to compare approved and rejected applicants on key measures such as 
income and requested loan-to-income (ReLTI). Finally, this section provides a 
crucial assessment of the existing operational functioning of the scheme and how 
this relates to the credit risk policy.  
4.3.1 Rejection rates and the underwriters’ reasons for rejections 
At this juncture we look at the credit acceptance and rejection rates on all 
applications submitted to the Housing Agency for underwriting and the reasons for 
rejections as a guide for the selection criteria. Overall 51 per cent of applications 
were approved by the underwriters. This is in line with the rejection rate data the 
ESRI collected as part of its Economic Sentiment Monitor (ESM) for renter 
households who applied for a mortgage. It might have been expected that the 
rejection rate would be higher for borrowers in the RIHL scheme if such households 
are higher credit risk. However, ESM applicants may be rejected based on 
insufficient financing or income under the regulatory environment, which may 
increase the rejection rate in this group. This is equivalent to not being eligible in 
the RIHL scheme data.  
TABLE 4.6 RIHL APPLICATIONS RECEIVED AND RECOMMENDED OUTCOMES  
 
Total no. applications 
received by Housing 
Agency 
% Approvals/ 





Invalid 743   
In process 74   
Recommended to 
approve 
2389 50.7 51.7 
Recommended to decline 2319 49.3 48.3 
Total 5525 100 100 
 
Source:  Housing Agency.  
Note:  Numbers refer to period February 2018–July 2019. The ESM numbers refer to actual approvals and rejections, 
whereas the Housing Agency numbers refer to applications recommended for approval/decline. 
 
Figure 4.2 presents information regarding the reasons for rejections by the 
underwriters. Nearly three in four rejections were due to insufficient income or 
repayment capacity. This is important, as allowing households who are vulnerable 
on this metric to have mortgage finance is likely to increase ex-post defaults. 
Considerable differences exist across LAs in terms of the recommended approval 
rates as presented in Figure 4.3. In general, higher approval rates are observed in 
Dublin and other urban areas such as Cork, Limerick and Galway city.  
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FIGURE 4.2 REASONS FOR RECOMMENDED REJECTION OF RIHL APPLICATION BY UNDERWRITERS 
 
 
Source:  Housing Agency.  
Notes:  These refer to the applications that the Housing Agency underwriters recommended to reject. We do not know if 
they were accepted or rejected in practice as the LA credit committees make the final decision. In total the 
underwriters assessed 4708 applications between 1 February 2018 and 31 July 2019. The Housing Agency also 
received 743 invalid applications, with 45 per cent of these occurring in the first 3 months of the scheme and 72 per 
cent occurring within the first 6 months of the scheme.  
 
FIGURE 4.3 PERCENTAGE OF RIHL APPLICATIONS UNDERWRITTEN BY HOUSING AGENCY THAT WERE 
RECOMMENDED FOR APPROVAL 
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At this juncture it is informative to compare the characteristics of borrowers whose 
applications were recommended for approval with those whose were declined.24 
Regarding income, it is clear from Figure 4.4(a) that in urban areas, a higher 
proportion of declined applications were from households at the lower end of the 
income distribution, whereas those who were approved tended to have higher 
incomes. In non-urban areas, this pattern is somewhat evident but less clear; a 
greater share of applicants higher up the income distribution are also declined. This 
may indicate that some applicants in areas with lower house prices, who may not 
be facing severe affordability challenges, are attempting to access this attractive 
mortgage scheme.  
Turning to LTI ratios, in urban areas 40 per cent of approvals had an ReLTI of 4.5–
5, with a further 20 per cent at 5–5.5 (Figure 4.4(c)). Virtually all applications with 
an ReLTI above 5.5 were recommended for rejection. In non-urban areas the 
spread is much greater (Figure 4.4(d)). Under the current macroprudential 
regulations, borrowers are permitted a maximum LTI of 3.5 unless they are granted 
an exemption. It is interesting to note that in urban areas only 10 per cent of 
approved applications had an ReLTI less than 3.5, whereas the corresponding 
figure for non-urban areas was 40 per cent. In addition, nearly 10 per cent of 
approved applications in non-urban areas had an ReLTI greater than 5. The credit 
risk implications of this will be discussed in Section 4.4.  
Figures 4.4(e) and (f) show the distributions of savings for approved and rejected 
applicants. In urban areas, nearly 40 per cent of declined applicants had savings of 
less than €10,000. Just over 20 per cent of approvals in urban areas also had savings 
of less than €10,000. This group is likely to contain a mixture of tenant purchase 
applicants and those receiving a gift who only need to provide 3 per cent of the 
purchase price in documented savings. 30 per cent of applicants in urban areas had 
savings of at least €32,000, the amount required to fund the maximum house price 
purchase with a 90 per cent LTV. Nearly 35 per cent of declined applications in non-
urban areas had less than €5000 in savings. 27 per cent of applicants in non-urban 
areas had savings of at least €25,000, the amount required to fund the maximum 




24  Differences in key characteristics between applicants recommended for approval and rejection are presented in 
Table A.2 in Appendix I.  
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FIGURE 4.4 INCOME, RELTI AND SAVINGS DISTRIBUTIONS FOR APPROVED V. DECLINED RIHL APPLICATIONS 
(a) 320k areas – income     (b) 250k areas – income  
(b)  (c) 320k areas – ReLTI     (d) 250k areas – ReLTI  
(e) 320k areas – savings     (f) 250k areas – savings  
 
Source:  Housing Agency microdata.  
Note:  ReLTI is calculated using the requested loan size for applications recommended to be declined and using the approved 
loan size for applications recommended for approval. Savings refer to the documented level of savings in an 
applicant’s savings account. They do not contain any potential gift an applicant may receive towards a down-
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4.3.2 Existing operational functioning of the scheme 
In terms of the credit risk policy of the existing operational functioning of the 
scheme, the application is received by the LA but the main credit assessment is 
done centrally by the Housing Agency. It is a considerable strength of the existing 
scheme to have trained, professional underwriters assessing the loan applications 
from a risk perspective. While this report is not an audit of the underwriting nor a 
compliance check, from consultations and discussions with the underwriting team, 
their processes, procedures and enforcement of the credit policy would appear to 
be good and strict. Indeed, three in four recommendations for rejection are for 
what could be classed as affordability issues, which would suggest prudence. The 
use of this centralised assessment function is a good step towards mitigating ex-
post default risk.  
Following its assessment, the Housing Agency provides a recommendation to the 
LA, which is then discussed by their credit committee. The LA credit committee has 
the final decision on credit allocation. Credit committees have at least three 
members, with a minimum of one from the Housing and Finance divisions at Senior 
Executive Officer level or above. At present, in cases where the LA credit 
committee wishes to go against the recommendation of the Housing Agency, it has 
the discretion to do so. Making a lending decision against the recommendation of 
trained underwriters is a significant risk. This has occurred across LAs, as presented 
in Table 4.7.  
Column 4 of Table 4.7 shows the percentage of total applications received that are 
sent to the Housing Agency for underwriting and credit assessment. There is 
significant variation across LAs, with an average of 86 per cent but falling as low as 
one third of applications in Cavan.25 This variation likely reflects both the validity 
of applications received as well as variation in the amount of pre-checking prior to 
sending the applications on to the Housing Agency. The final two columns of Table 
15 show that the number of applications accepted by the credit committee is 
higher than the number of recommended acceptances by the Housing Agency 
underwriters in 12 of the 31 LAs, significantly so in some cases.  
  
 
25  There is a data timing mismatch here as the LGMA data on total number of applications are for end of June 2019 
whereas the Housing Agency underwriting data are for end of July 2019. Cases of percentages greater than 100 are 
likely due to this.  
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Carlow 93 65 69.9 24  39 
Cavan 48 16 33.3 8  9 
Clare 86 75 87.2 30  40 
Cork City 195 189 96.9 89  66 
Cork County 323 365 113.0 196  178 
Donegal 39 44 112.8 21  24 
Dublin:       
Dublin City 592 529 89.4 324  533 
DLR 143 121 84.6 68  36 
Fingal 723 649 89.8 382  328 
South Dublin 401 338 84.3 178  117 
Galway City  118 98 83.1 52  43 
Galway County 182 164 90.1 59  49 
Kerry 163 117 71.8 52  51 
Kildare 369 174 47.2 87  73 
Kilkenny 51 45 88.2 24  32 
Laois 142 104 73.2 55  55 
Leitrim 18 15 83.3 <5  5 
Limerick 198 124 62.6 76  76 
Longford 46 49 106.5 23  22 
Louth 127 119 93.7 45  73 
Mayo 90 69 76.7 29  52 
Meath 269 291 108.2 201  144 
Monaghan 48 42 87.5 16  11 
Offaly 70 45 64.3 18  22 
Roscommon 51 52 102.0 22  22 
Sligo 55 53 96.4 27  22 
Tipperary 281 127 45.2 59  56 
Waterford 121 84 69.4 34  39 
Westmeath 63 41 65.1 28  26 
Wexford 142 136 95.8 69  78 
Wicklow 241 182 75.5 89  87 
Total 5488 4708 85.8 2389  2408 
 
Note:  Five counties appear to send a higher number of applications to Housing Agency than total applications they 
received, but this may be due to the date mismatch. The red text indicates where an LA has provisionally approved 
a greater number of loans than has been recommended for approval by the Housing Agency underwriters. 
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It is not possible to definitively evaluate whether this practice has already 
increased the credit risk of the loan book without access to appropriate microdata. 
However, given the recommendation from the underwriter was to reject, 
approving these cases is highly likely to increase credit defaults and may lead to 
vulnerabilities going forward.  
This issue has been identified and a remedial strategy put in place by the 
Department of Housing, Local Government and Heritage (DHLGH). This was 
outlined in Circular 28/2019. The strategy requires LAs to report within ten working 
days to the Department instances where the LA credit committee’s decision on a 
loan application differs from the Housing Agency recommendation on that 
application. The report should contain the number and value of applications and a 
description of how and why the Credit Committee’s decision differed. These rules 
apply from September 2019.  
While this change is clearly welcome, it does not eliminate the risk that the LAs can 
continue to go against the underwriting assessment if they so wish. Additional 
options to improve safeguards could be explored. The strictest of these would be 
to remove the discretion to approve an application that has been rejected for 
underwriting. A second option would be to allow the LA to appeal cases back to 
the underwriter and provide supporting information. The underwriter would then 
be provided with an opportunity to revise their assessment. However, if the 
underwriter rejects the appeal, the loan application should not proceed.26 
These measures all relate to cases where the underwriters have provided a 
negative recommendation. In cases where the underwriters have given approval, 
LAs should have full authority to layer additional safeguards over and above the 
existing credit policy and reject approved applicants if they have a prudential 
reason to. For example, one LA suggested it would like to have a minimum income 
threshold and deploy a maximum LTI ratio. Given that the credit risk remains on its 
balance sheet, such steps would enhance the credit risk of its portfolio.27 Such 
changes should be objective, evidence-based and consistent with the national 
nature of the scheme.  
4.4 UNDERSTANDING THE CREDIT RISK PROFILE OF EXISTING LENDING 
In this section we discuss the key measures used in best practice internationally to 
understand the credit risk profile of existing lending and to identify vulnerabilities 
in a portfolio. To provide an initial indication of the level of credit risk of the existing 
lending, we explore the trends in loan arrears. We then use microdata from the 
 
26  These changes would require a change in the supporting legislation and the credit policy.  
27  Again, these changes would require a change in the supporting legislation and the credit policy.  
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Housing Agency to explore credit conditions at origination in order to identify 
potential vulnerabilities that may lead to heightened future credit risk.  
4.4.1 Originating credit conditions and loan arrears 
Of critical importance to understanding the credit risk of the underlying portfolio 
is up-to-date information on credit conditions at origination as well as current LTV 
ratios and the delinquency status of the current portfolio. Best practice 
internationally for monitoring and reviewing trends in loan arrears is the receipt of 
microdata at the loan level with sufficient information to stress test the portfolio. 
These data would be equivalent to those collected by the CBI on a 6-monthly basis. 
Portfolios of loans that are securitised and used as collateral for the ECB are also 
subjected to the publication of loan-level data for investors to monitor their 
performance. The critical fields for monitoring in these data are the originating and 
current LTV ratio, fields relating to income at origination, and information on the 
loan default status (performing/impaired or days past due (DPD)).  
In relation to the credit risk of the underlying pool of mortgages issued under the 
RIHL scheme, a number of data sources can be leveraged to piece together the 
current performance of the loans. The data submitted to the Department by the 
LGMA record the number of arrears cases, and the arrears balance, on a monthly 
basis. Using the latest available data from June 2019, approximately 1.2 per cent 
of the loans are in any day arrears. This equates to a total of 12 cases across the 
1021 drawdowns indicated. Eight of these loans are in arrears for less than 90 days, 
with only four indicated as having passed the standard definition of non-
performing, which is 90 DPD. An overview of these data is presented in Figure 4.5.  
 FIGURE 4.5  DEFAULT RATE OF RIHL LOANS AS OF JUNE 2019  
 





Performing Impaired < 90 days Default (90+dpd)
Credit policy and credit risk assessment | 75 
 
 
In terms of assessing default rates, it is informative to compare the default rate of 
these RIHL loans with loans issued over the same period in the commercial market. 
Data from the CBI indicate that loans issued over that period have an identical 0.4 
per cent default rate to the RIHL loans. That RIHL default rates are currently in line 
with commercial lending is positive, but not surprising given the strong 
performance of the Irish economy over this period.  
The data above indicate that a number of RIHL loans are in arrears but not yet in 
default, i.e. have less than 90 DPD on payments. To attempt to understand the 
credit risk trajectory of the portfolio, and to appropriately measure the flow of 
loans into arrears with the objective of estimating the potential portfolio losses, 
credit risk modelling focuses on loan credit performance transitions (Kelly, 2011; 
Gaffney et al., 2014a, 2014b). Such transitions explore how loans move in and out 
of default across ranges of DPD over time. For example, this method would take all 
loans in period A and look at their credit performance, and then match this to their 
credit performance in period B. If the portfolio credit risk is worsening 
considerably, loans would be seen to flow from lower buckets of DPD to higher 
over time. This is clearly demonstrated by Kelly and O’Malley (2016) in relation to 
the Irish mortgage market during the financial crisis.  
To undertake such an analysis requires detailed microdata on the individual loans 
and the ability to follow the performance of the loan over time. The Department 
currently receives a loan-level data drop from the LAs, the Data Gathering Initiative 
(DGI) return, which contains information on the loan performance in terms of 
arrears. These data have been provided to us for the purposes of undertaking an 
initial exploration of default transitions in LA loans issued from 1 February 2018. 
Table 2.2 gives a full overview of these data. In this dataset, it is not fully possible 
to specifically identify RIHL loans. However, using the origination dates and other 
loan characteristics (e.g. interest rate, term), it is possible to consider all loans 
issued by the LAs since February 2018 that have the correct characteristics for a 
RIHL loan. We would expect most of these to be RIHL loans. It must be noted that 
while the number of loans in the DGI dataset is similar, it does not correspond 
exactly to the number of loans in the LGMA data.  
For the purposes of this analysis, we take the quarterly loan drops of data from 
June 2018 to June 2019. The overall trend in loan arrears on these accounts is 
presented in Figure 4.6. There are very few loans in default, with none recorded in 
June 2019, but a considerable share with some DPD. The lack of loans in default is 
inconsistent with the LGMA data and warrants further analysis. The considerable 
share of short-term arrears may be due to recording issues. For example, during 
consultations for this review, one LA indicated that it has to provide these data to 
the Department at a point in the month before some payments are due and they 
are consequently recorded as in arrears. Furthermore, some of these 1-month 
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arrears cases could represent technical defaults where borrowers miss a payment 
purely by accident due to date issues. Such defaults normally self-cure immediately 
and are not seen as a problem from a credit risk perspective.  
It is important to be able to accurately monitor loans that do fall into 1-month 
arrears in order to act with the aim of preventing a deterioration into longer term 
arrears. To be able to do this, it is important that households are only recorded as 
being in arrears if they did not make the full payment on their last payment date, 
and not simply because their payment date falls after the monthly recording cut-
off date. Furthermore, as LAs are also required to provide this information for the 
Central Credit Register, incorrectly recording borrowers as in arrears on their 
payments may have considerable consequences for a borrower in terms of 
worsening their credit score, through no fault of their own. 
It must be noted that this review has not undertaken an audit of the processes or 
data gathering and reporting activities of loan authorities. Our reflections 
presented here are purely based on the consultations, which highlighted some 
common patterns that require additional analysis. It is proposed that a working 
group be set up to manage data gathering and the processes around data collection 
and reporting as part of the ongoing RIHL scheme, and this forum should identify 
these issues.  
FIGURE 4.6  PERCENTAGE OF RIHL LOANS BY ARREARS STATUS 
  
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations based on DGI loan-level data. 
Note:  For each quarter these data include all LA loans drawn down between 1 February 2018 and the end of that quarter, 
with an interest rate equal to one of the two RIHL fixed interest rates or variable rate loans if specifically declared as 
RIHL. From June LGMA data: eight cases of arrears <90 days, four cases of arrears >90 days (based on 1021 drawn-
down loans). From April LGMA data, eight cases of arrears (definition or duration not specified) out of a total of 830 
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Importantly for our analysis, we can use the granular data to explore whether the 
loans in the portfolio are transitioning to worse DPD bands, which would point 
towards a worsening of credit risk.  
In Table 4.8 we present a series of arrears transition matrices using the DGI LA loan-
level data. It is helpful to focus on the most recent data available, presented in the 
bottom panel. The purpose of this panel is to take all the loans in a given period, 
March 2019, to classify them as performing, up to 1 month in arrears, 1–3 months 
in arrears or 3 or more months in arrears, typically referred to as default. We then 
follow these loans into the next period, June 2019, and see how many of them have 
remained in each category and how many have transitioned into another category. 
For example, from the bottom panel we see that in March 2019 there were 671 
performing loans and by June 2019 641 of these were still performing, 27 had 
transitioned into one-month arrears, three were in one to three months arrears. 
Of the 116 loans that were in arrears of up to 1 month in March 2019, 23 had self-
cured and become performing by June 2019, while 93 remained up to 1 month in 
arrears. None had worsened to either 1–3 months arrears or default.  
There are several points to be taken from Table 4.8. First, as also shown in Figure 
4.6, there is a fairly high proportion of loans in arrears of up to 1 month: 16 per 
cent of loans in June 2019. A large number of loans in arrears of up to 1 month, 
particularly given that many of these loans have only been drawn down a matter 
of months ago, could potentially be a concern. However, as discussed above, it 
seems likely that this is due to an issue with how the arrears status is calculated in 
the dataset. One positive to be taken from Table 4.8 is that we do not observe 
significant deteriorations in loan status towards 1–3 month arrears or default. For 
instance, between March 2019 and June 2019, none of the 116 loans in one-month 
arrears had deteriorated to 1–3 months in arrears or default, while none of the 20 
loans initially in 1–3 months arrears progressed to default and 15 actually reduced 
to 1-month arrears or self-cured and became performing. The lack of transitions 
towards lengthier periods of missed payments is obviously a positive sign. 
Nevertheless, gaining a clearer understanding of how the arrears status is 
calculated in these loan level data is crucial and an aspect that requires further 
investigation. 
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TABLE 4.8  RIHL ARREARS TRANSITION MATRICES  
   Performing Up to 1 month 1–3 months ≥3 months 
    September 2018   
June 2018 24 Performing 15 7 2 0 
 11 Up to 1 month 6 5 0 0 
 0 1–3 months 0 0 0 0 
 0 ≥3 months 0 0 0 0 
    December 2018   
September 2018 171* Performing 147 21 3 0 
 37 Up to 1 month 4 32 1 0 
 8 1–3 months 6 0 2 0 
 0 ≥3 months 0 0 0 0 
    March 2019   
December 2018 434 Performing 400 28 4 2 
 78 Up to 1 month 20 57 1 0 
 12 1–3 months 3 5 4 0 
 0 ≥3 months 0 0 0 0 
    June 2019   
March 2019 671 Performing 641 27 3 0 
 116 Up to 1 month 23 93 0 0 
 20 1–3 months 8 7 5 0 
 2 ≥3 months 1 1 0 0 
 
Source:  DGI loan-level data. 
Note:  * Should be 173 but two loans disappear from the data between September and December 2018.  
  
A second element to understanding the credit risk of the current portfolio is to 
explore trends in the key credit conditions, in particular LTV ratios, LTI ratios and 
DSTI ratios. These indicators are very important predictors of vulnerabilities in the 
portfolio and therefore of future credit risks.  
With regard to the LTV ratio, the scheme imposes a maximum LTV of 90 per cent 
as previously documented. On the RIHL application form applicants are requested 
to fill in a potential purchase price, but this is poorly filled in.28 In any case, this 
house price refers to the price of the property the borrower expects to purchase, 
not the price of the house they actually purchase, and would therefore not give a 
true and accurate LTV even if it were fully completed. The responsibility to check 
that the 90 per cent LTV limit is adhered to therefore falls on LAs when the sale is 
agreed and the loan is drawn down. To the best of our knowledge, data on the 
 
28  In the Housing Agency microdata provided for this review, this prospective LTV figure is only present for 38 per cent 
of applications recommended for approval and none of those recommended for rejection.  
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actual LTV are not recorded centrally, while data on the property price are not 
collected in a way that allows an LTV to be calculated. It is therefore not possible 
to examine this crucial aspect of credit risk in this report, or indeed to assess 
whether the 90 per cent limit is being adhered to in practice. This is a major data 
gap and should be addressed. It is our understanding that it is the responsibility of 
the LAs at present to ensure adherence to the 90 per cent LTV limit. However, we 
feel this should be a shared competency with the underwriting team to ensure the 
loan assessors have full information on the deposits provided and its impact on 
credit risk.  
In addition, while the scheme imposes a maximum LTV ratio of 90 per cent, 
meaning that a minimum 10 per cent deposit is required, the credit policy states 
that only 3 per cent of the value of the property needs to come from documented 
cash savings. As noted in Section 4.2, exemptions from this savings share are 
permitted. The Housing Agency have indicated this has only been used on a couple 
of occasions since the start of the scheme. This is positive as the use of this 
exemption from the savings share heightens risk and should not be used 
extensively.  
FIGURE 4.7  DSTI RATIO – APPROVED RIHL APPLICATIONS ONLY  
(a) Single applications       (b) Joint applications  
 
Source:  Housing Agency microdata. 
Note:  Applications recommended for approval only.  
  
Using the Housing Agency microdata, we can examine the distribution of the DSTI 
for the applications recommended for approval (Figure 4.7). Monitoring the DSTI 
is crucial for assessing vulnerabilities in the current portfolio. Unsurprisingly, the 
vast majority of applicants have a DSTI of 30 per cent or more. This is particularly 
true for single applicants and those in areas with a €320,000 maximum house price. 
Joint applicants in €250,000 areas are much more evenly spread across the DSTI 
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maximum DSTI may potentially heighten the credit risk of the portfolio if they have 
less income diversification. On the other hand, we see minimal cases of DSTIs 
exceeding the 35 per cent limit, indicating that these exemptions do not appear to 
be widely used. This is positive from a credit risk perspective.  
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FIGURE 4.8  RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NET INCOME RATIO AND GROSS HOUSEHOLD INCOME 
(a) €320k areas  
  
(b) €250k areas      
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Figure 4.8 plots the relationship between gross household income and the DSTI. 
The maximum permissible DSTI differs according to income bands. We can see 
clear evidence of these maximums being hit in urban areas, with clusters of 
observations at 30, 31, 32, 33, 34 and 35 per cent at different parts of the income 
distribution (Figure 4.8(a)), but not so in non-urban areas other than a clustering 
around 30 per cent. In general, there is a fair amount of dispersion of DSTIs at all 
income levels, although there is a noticeably higher concentration at or above 30 
per cent in urban areas. It is not the case that those on lower incomes tend to have 
higher DSTI ratios. In fact, high DSTI ratios appear to occur throughout the income 
distribution, in both urban and non-urban areas.  
Turning to LTIs, given the RIHL scheme does not impose LTI limits, we would expect 
scheme applicants to have higher LTIs than those accessing credit through the 
banking sector. Indeed this is the case, with one-third of approvals having a ReLTI 
of 4.5–5 and a further 20 per cent exceeding 5 (Figure 3.12). Moreover, less than 
10 per cent of those who received an LTI exemption in 2018 had an LTI of >4.5 
(Kinghan and McCann, 2019, Figure 5), compared to just over 50 per cent of RIHL 
recommended approvals. These households will be inherently riskier than those 
able to access mortgage credit from the banking sector, which is to be expected.  
One interesting point demonstrated in Figure 4.9 is that the maximum house price 
and therefore loan size thresholds act as a cap on the maximum LTI households at 
the higher end of the RIHL income distribution can have. This results in a situation 
where the maximum allowable LTI is actually higher for lower- than for higher-
income households. While to some extent high LTIs are to be expected from this 
cohort, particularly in urban areas with acute affordability challenges, the number 
of high LTIs in non-urban areas without widespread severe affordability challenges 
is a concern. From a credit risk perspective, these high leverage levels heighten the 
risk of the portfolio.  
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FIGURE 4.9  RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RELTI RATIO AND GROSS HOUSEHOLD INCOME 
(a) €320k areas  
 
(b) €250k areas      
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Two final points are worth noting in relation to the credit risk of the RIHL scheme. 
First, lower-income households are found to default more often. Figure 4.10(a) 
shows the arrears rate of Irish mortgage holder households over the period 2014–
2017 across buckets of the current income distribution. The arrears rate for 
households within the targeted group of the income distribution (less than 
€75,000) is considerably higher than those at higher income levels. It is therefore 
expected that the arrears on the RIHL loans would be higher than for the 
commercial market, which lends to higher-income individuals. This should be built 
into any exploration of the future credit risk of the portfolio. It must be noted that 
income shocks are more likely to cause default relative to the income level 
(Slaymaker et al., 2019). However, low-income households may be more 
susceptible to income shocks or have fragile employment, which is a major 
determinant of arrears (McCarthy, 2014). That is why having strong measures to 
limit indebtedness for low-income households is of critical importance. Note also 
that the level of arrears is elevated in Figure 4.10 due to the legacy of the financial 
crisis. These levels of arrears are not necessarily an expectation, or good predictor, 
of the level of future arrears flows at these income bands. Rather, they are an 
indicator of the relative risk.  
The second point is that the higher the current DSTI ratio, the higher the arrears 
rate will be. Figure 4.10(b) shows the default rate for Irish mortgage holders over 
the period 2014–2017 for different levels of the current DSTI ratio using the Survey 
on Income and Living Conditions (SILC) dataset. While it would be expected that 
incomes rise over time, which would lower the current debt service ratio for fixed-
rate loans, RIHL loans originated at higher levels of the DSTI close to or at the 35 
per cent limit will leave such borrowers with considerable vulnerabilities and few 
buffers to withstand shocks. It is clear that households are clustering at the 
maximum allowable limits from the analysis in Figure 4.8. However, the use of the 
graduated lowering of limits for low-income households is positive for resilience 
(Table 4.4).  
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FIGURE 4.10  PERCENTAGE OF MORTGAGED HOUSEHOLDS IN ARREARS BY INCOME AND DSTI RATIO 
(a) Income      (b) DSTI 
 
Source:  SILC, 2014–2017. ‘Arrears’ refers to having missed at least one payment in the past 12 months due to financial 
difficulties.  
4.5 ADDITIONAL SAFEGUARDS AND LOAN ARREARS MANAGEMENT 
STRATEGY 
This section provides a brief discussion of some additional safeguards that are in 
place and considers the current loan arrears management framework, which is 
critical to dealing with cases of default.  
4.5.1 Mortgage insurance  
Under the RIHL credit policy, it is a legal requirement for the borrower to have the 
mandated LA mortgage insurance in place for the drawdown balance and the term 
of the loan. The LA will arrange for mortgage protection insurance under the 
standard LA MPI scheme. The cost of MPI, which covers both death and permanent 
disability, is currently 0.5550 per cent (see Housing Circular 3/2017) and should be 
considered when calculating the borrower’s capacity to repay the loan. This 
protection is greater in scope than the standard life cover that is required by 
commercial lenders.  
4.5.2 High arrears new lending restriction 
As of September 2019, the Department has issued a circular that introduces an 
additional layer of safeguards against future default.29 The circular indicates that 
in cases where the total level of arrears for a particular LA on loans allocated under 
the RIHL scheme rise above 5 per cent of the total extended balances, the LA will 
be requested to discontinue issuing these loans. Warnings of arrears levels will be 
issued where arrears exceed 3 and 4 per cent of its RIHL book.  
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Introducing a broad risk mitigation strategy such as this is an important safeguard 
for the scheme. This will limit the level of lending by LAs whose portfolios are not 
performing well and will ensure that new drawdowns do not occur in areas with 
high arrears rates. A further potential benefit is that this works to ensure maximum 
effort among LAs to ensure prudent allocation by limiting their future access to the 
scheme in the case of realised ex-post default.  
While a broad rule is welcome, a number of elements should be considered for the 
current parameterisation. First, the objective of the lending is to low-income 
households who are a higher credit risk. The portfolio is therefore going to 
experience defaults at a higher rate than the broader economy. Further 
explorations should be undertaken as to setting of the parameter at 5 per cent 
given the objective of lending to low-income households.  
Second, if the economy is struck with an economic shock, it is likely that some areas 
will be hit harder. If this is the case, the arrears rates are likely to rise in these areas 
relative to other areas. Even if all LAs undertake prudent risk management, the 
spatial diffusion of economic shocks will have the consequence that some areas 
will experience higher rates of default. With the current rule, this will have a 
disproportionate effect on some areas that is outside their control.  
Finally, for LAs who issue a small number of loans, one loan could make up a large 
portion of its portfolio. As it is likely that arrears cases will happen due to non-
economic factors such as sickness or changes in family circumstances, one arrears 
case could cut off a whole LA’s activity.  
Furthermore, as with any state lending product, there may be a benefit to the 
scheme being operated in a counter-cyclical manner, i.e. if the commercial banks 
pull back, then it could be desired that the scheme would increase to deal with the 
credit crunch. This is most likely to happen during a downturn, when the arrears 
rate will naturally rise. If the current hard limit cuts off the lending activity, then 
the ability to use policy in a counter-cyclical manner is limited.  
Consideration should be given to how a balance can be struck between the overall 
scheme safeguard and ensuring the programme’s continued operation under well-
managed credit risks.  
4.5.3 Arrears management and loan resolution 
While it is not within the scope of this report to undertake a full review of the local 
government sector’s mortgage arrears resolution policy, the following observation 
is presented. Historically the arrears rate on LA loans has been high and the 
balances in arrears have been slow to fall despite the buoyant economy. Given the 
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RIHL scheme increases the scope and scale of LA lending considerably relative to 
the preceding years, and the fact that the profile of borrowers has likely changed, 
it would be good practice to take stock of the code of conduct guidelines and 
functionality of the mortgage arrears resolution procedure,30 explore whether it 
follows best practice and determine whether any changes should be made given 
the changed LA lending context. This process should be cognisant of the incentives 
of borrowers in terms of their repayment behaviour and be wary of strategic 
defaults.  
This is made all the more important by the fact that loan losses may be more 
difficult to carry for smaller LAs. It is our understanding that a central loan arrears 
resolution fund, which can be accessed as a last resort, is available in cases where 
the LA is finding it difficult to cover the loan losses. Given the scale of the RIHL 
scheme relative to previous LA lending, it would be prudent to take stock of the 
policies, procedures and capacity of LAs to manage and absorb loan delinquencies. 
Forecasting and stress testing of loan exposures should be done on a regular basis 
as a good-practice risk monitoring tool, and the fund linked to such an assessment.  
4.6 CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS 
A number of findings emerge from this chapter regarding the risks and other 
operational considerations of the RIHL scheme. The main points are as follows. 
Credit policy and credit risk assessment 
• The scheme has aligned its LTV ratio with the level set by the Central Bank for FTBs, 90 
per cent. This is prudent.  
• The credit assessment includes a maximum DSTI that is used by many countries as a 
macroprudential tool. The calibration of the RIHL limit, at a maximum of 35 per cent, 
would appear to be in the prudent range relative to international norms. The maximum 
tightens to 30 per cent for lower-income households, which is sensible. A tightening of 
the open allowance for lending above the cap should be explored. 
• As of June 2019, the default rate for RIHL loans (arrears of 90 days or more) was 0.4 per 
cent, which is identical to the default rate on commercial loans with a similar vintage from 
CBI data. 
• It is likely that the default rate on the RIHL loans will exceed that on commercial loans 
over time, as research shows that lower-income borrowers default more often. As the 
aim of the scheme is to extend credit to such households, once sufficient credit policy 
 
30  Dealing with mortgage arrears – a guide for local authorities. 
https://www.housing.gov.ie/sites/default/files/migrated-
files/en/Publications/DevelopmentandHousing/Housing/FileDownLoad%2C30943%2Cen.pdf  
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safeguards are followed at origination, in isolation, a somewhat higher default rate on 
RIHL loans will not necessarily undermine the achievement of the scheme objectives, nor 
should it automatically be used to curtail the programme. 
• An overall cap on LA lending for areas with arrears greater than 5 per cent of the portfolio 
has been introduced to safeguard against high portfolio losses that may arise. 
• A strong feature of the scheme is the centralised credit assessment. However, 
operationally, it is at the discretion of LA credit committees to overturn the assessment 
of the underwriting team. The data indicate that this has occurred in some LAs where 
approvals have exceeded the level suggested by the underwriters. Without access to 
adequate microdata at loan origination stage, it is not possible to assess whether this has 
already exposed the current portfolio to higher risks. 
• The DHLGH has already taken welcome steps to address this issue by ensuring that 
deviations from the underwriting assessment are reported and explained. Some further 
options for strengthening such safeguards could be considered. 
• As the credit risk lies with the LAs, any loan losses will have to be covered from their 
funds. If losses are high, this may impact other LA services. 
• At present, it is not possible to provide full insight into the vulnerabilities of the portfolio 
without access to granular microdata on LTV, LTI and DSTI ratios at origination. This data 
gap should be addressed with haste. 
• Considerable data gaps exist in terms of collating a centralised database of loans that 
monitors their performance. Suggestions for ongoing data collation and monitoring are 
provided in Section 6.2. Annual stress tests should be conducted on the portfolio to 
provide accurate measures of potential arrears. 
Given the scale of the RIHL scheme relative to previous LA lending, it would be 
prudent to take stock of the policies, procedures and capacity of LAs to manage 
and absorb loan delinquencies. The following are further suggestions on credit 
policy. 
• Consider limiting the maximum age to the statutory retirement age. 
• Consider limiting exemptions from the saving share of equity. 
• While the main credit safeguard for RIHL is the application of a 35 per cent net income 
ratio that falls to 30 per cent for low-income households, some further measures could 
be useful, such as a minimum income limit, an increase in the interest rate, income 
multiple restriction or a formal residual income test.  
• For contract employees who have less than 3 months remaining on their contracts, 
ensure that any commitment from the employer to employment renewal is put in writing. 




Scheme operational funding, housing market impact and other risks 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The objectives of this chapter are threefold: first, we explore the scheme funding 
and operational structures. Second, we explore the impact of the drawdowns to 
date on the housing market. Third, we explore the impact on government finances 
and other selected risks.  
5.2 OPERATIONAL STRUCTURES AND SCHEME FUNDING  
5.2.1 Scheme funding and allocations monitoring 
The original announced Rebuilding Ireland Home Loan (RIHL) scheme was to be 
funded up to €200m over a 3 year period. At the beginning of the scheme, the 
Housing Finance Agency (HFA) borrowed €200m in funds at a competitive fixed 
rate from the National Treasury Management Agency (NTMA) to lend to the local 
authorities (LAs) for the scheme. It was noted that these funds were to cover the 
fixed-rate products and the HFA would secure funding for the variable-rate loans 
from the market. The setting of the original €200m was established based on the 
projected demand for the scheme at inception. Within the scheme, each LA 
receives a capital allowance. While there were some reallocations across LAs, the 
allocations at the end of 2018 are presented in Table 5.1.  
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TABLE 5.1 RIHL CAPITAL ALLOCATIONS 2018   
LA Capital allowance (€) Allowance share (%) No. applications Application share (%) 
Carlow 5,200,000 2 93 2 
Cavan 2,100,000 1 48 1 
Clare 4,500,000 2 86 2 
Cork City 1,520,000 1 195 4 
Cork County 6,000,000 3 323 6 
Donegal 2,000,000 1 39 1 
Dublin City 50,000,000 24 592 11 
DLR 10,020,000 5 143 3 
Fingal 19,276,000 9 723 13 
South Dublin 25,000,000 12 401 7 
Galway City 3,000,000 1 118 2 
Galway County 3,924,000 2 182 3 
Kerry 3,075,000 1 163 3 
Kildare 8,000,000 4 369 7 
Kilkenny 6,080,000 3 51 1 
Laois 5,500,000 3 142 3 
Leitrim 500,000 0 18 0 
Limerick 2,545,916 1 198 4 
Longford 1,200,000 1 46 1 
Louth 4,300,000 2 127 2 
Mayo  5,456,036 3 90 2 
Meath 9,300,000 4 269 5 
Monaghan  5,000,000 2 48 1 
Offaly 1,700,000 1 70 1 
Roscommon 1,500,000 1 51 1 
Sligo  3,375,000 2 55 1 
Tipperary  1,978,470 1 281 5 
Waterford 2,000,000 1 121 2 
Westmeath 4,576,000 2 63 1 
Wexford  7,000,000 3 142 3 
Wicklow 4,000,000 2 241 4 
TOTAL  209,626,422 100 5488 100 
 
Source:  https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/debates/question/2019-03-05/596/ 
 
From the applications that have been received for the scheme, demand has far 
exceeded the original amount expected. Using the granular data from the Housing 
Agency, it is possible to estimate the total value of applications received. As of early 
September 2019,31 the total value of loans applied for (which was deemed valid in 
terms of the scheme conditions) was €782m.  
As of June 2019, LA credit committees had provisionally approved 2408 loans 
 
31  The latest date for applications received in our granular data extract from the Housing Agency was 5 September.  
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valued at over €454m, well in excess of the initial allocations. Loan applications 
expired amounted to €92m, leading to an overall facility exposure of €363m. 
Drawdowns, however, had not exceeded the initial facility, standing at €178m.  
Following discussions with the Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, an 
increase in the overall capital allowance for the scheme was provided in August 
2019, amounting to €363m, to cover the exposure of the scheme. This takes the 
total allocation to the scheme to €563m. The balance of the funds not already 
earmarked to cover approvals or drawdown is envisaged to be made available for 
drawdown until June 2020 (for applications made in 2019 with a 6 month 
drawdown window from approval). The HFA has confirmed that it will provide the 
additional tranche of funding at the 1.5 per cent rate.  
While no LA exceeded its allocation in terms of drawdowns, the approvals were 
above those envisaged in the original fund. In a general banking context, it can be 
difficult to map approvals to drawdowns (roll rate) as borrowers take time moving 
through the process or may even decide to withdraw from the transaction. For this 
scheme, it does take time to build up a picture of the roll rate and this is now 
becoming clearer based on the Local Government Management Agency (LGMA) 
submitted data. However, it is important that the exposures of the scheme stay 
within the limits of the overall level set centrally. While it was clear that demand 
outstripped the initial €200m, the new revised allocation, based on the 2019 data, 
should provide a better matching of capital allowances to demand going forward 
and should make it less likely that LAs find themselves coming up against a binding 
allocation. However, it is important that overall scheme activity stays within the 
sanctioned amount. While this might mean a delay or denial of applications once 
the figures are reached, this safeguard must be put in place to ensure the 
sustainability of the scheme. Indeed, it may not be possible to satiate all the 
demand, given that the level of the overall funding will be capped for risk and 
operational reasons. Careful monitoring of the level of approvals relative to the 
capital allowances by the Department of Housing, Local Government and Heritage 
(DHLGH) and the LAs should be continued and strengthened. 
It is also noteworthy that the geographic concentration of demand is greatest in 
the urban areas. This may lead to excess demand relative to allowances in some 
urban areas and lower demand relative to allowances in other areas that could be 
channelled to areas with greater demand on a frequent basis. Indeed, given the 
demand-led orientation of the scheme, it is challenging to set allowances at an LA 
level. If an alternative mechanism could be developed to ensure activity remains 
within the sanctioned amount, it would be potentially more efficient to move away 
from a strict LA-level allowance. If this is not possible, data from the applications 
levels can be used to better target the allowances given that the scheme is more 
than 18 months in operation. At a minimum, consideration should be given to a 
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structured and time-bound appraisal of the use of allocations which could lead to 
increased channelling of credit towards areas with greater demand. A reserve fund 
could be used to top up allocations for areas where demand has exceeded 
projections, all within the scheme-sanctioned amount. The critical elements for 
any reform would be flexibility across areas with certainty on controlling the 
activity relative to sanction levels.  
5.2.2 Term risk and operational funding 
Lending activity under the scheme is ultimately funded by the HFA, which provides 
a borrowing facility for LAs. These lending facilities are provided on a long-term 
basis for fixed-rate loans, leveraging the low cost of government financing available 
at present. LAs can pass this directly to households in the form of lower-cost, 
longer-term fixed-rate loans. The HFA does not carry credit risk as the LA is the 
ultimate borrower and carries an implicit government guarantee. This is a long-
standing policy of the HFA to assign a zero credit risk to LAs. 
While any maturity transformation inevitably contains risk, the HFA undertakes to 
manage interest rate risk across its lending portfolio.32 In this context, the term risk 
(which would ultimately be borne by the Housing Finance Agency) would be low 
given the relatively moderate level of the scheme and would be no different to its 
lending activities for other longer-term activities, such as lending to Approved 
Housing Bodies.  
Ultimately, the ability to manage the term risk would link to the cost of long-term 
financing available to the HFA, which in turn borrows from the NTMA. It is 
ultimately an evaluation of the cost of funds to the NTMA that sets the appropriate 
price to the LAs. The NTMA has issued €66bn in medium to long-term debt since 
2015 at a 14.3 year weighted maturity carrying an average interest rate of 1.1 per 
cent. Indeed, the average rate on long-term debt has fallen markedly from 2012 
(see Figure 5.1). On 9 May 2019 the NTMA raised €4bn through the syndicated 
sales of a new 30 year treasury bond at an average yield of 1.53 per cent.33  
 
32  We would like to thank the HFA for the provision of information on its risk management strategy. 
33  https://www.ntma.ie/news/ntma-raises-4-billion-from-sale-of-new-2050-benchmark-bond 
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FIGURE 5.1 AVERAGE INTEREST RATE ON GOVERNMENT LONG-TERM DEBT  
 
Source:  NTMA Investor Briefing Pack, August 2019.  
 
While it is outside the scope of this report to evaluate in detail the long-term 
pricing decisions set by the HFA, given the current interest rate environment and 
the ability of the NTMA to fund long-term debt at rates around 1.1 per cent on 
average, the pricing for the current funding tranche would appear to be 
appropriate given the maturity. It appears that the current long-term financing 
rates of 1.5 and 1.75 per cent for the 25 and 30 year fixed rate could ultimately be 
fully hedged by HFA borrowing at the current interest rates, thus allowing interest 
rate risk to be sanitised. Whether this occurs is a decision for the HFA in line with 
its own interest rate risk management policy. It is not within the scope of this 
report to explore this. 
However, interest rates for long-term funding are subject to considerable 
fluctuation given the Irish and global financing environments. If funding tranches 
are to be made available for continued schemes into the future, these will have to 
be priced at the long-term rate in the market when the scheme is issued. While 
maturity risk can be managed for existing liabilities, the base rate from which the 
current lending activity is financed should rise in line with the cost to the state of 
raising long-term finance for future iterations of the scheme if they are to be 
provided on long-term fixed-rate contracts.  
On an operational point, any delays between the drawdown activity of the loan 
and the facility drawdown for the LAs from the HFA, whereby LAs are using own 
funds to cover mortgages, provides a challenge to the HFA in understanding what 
its exposure is going to be. Consideration should be given to shortening the 
timespan or looking at other operational mechanisms to provide a more 
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5.2.3 Organisational structures 
As can be gleaned from the descriptions above in terms of funding and credit risk, 
the organisational structures for the provision of the RIHL loans are multilayered 
due to the multiple agencies involved in the process: a total of 35 organisations. 
Figure 5.2 briefly describes the organisational process. 




Source: ESRI observations. 
 
The requirement to monitor and manage 31 separate LAs, all with different credit 
committees, local market needs, organisational structures and information 
gathering systems, adds considerable complexity to the process. This leaves the 
scheme open to challenges in terms of data collection, monitoring, harmonisation 
of processes and procedures, etc. In particular, information sharing across agencies 
may be difficult where recording systems are incompatible. 
A good example is as follows. It was noted in the consultations that borrowers can 
apply (and have applied) to various LAs simultaneously. They can therefore receive 
multiple approvals or different outcomes from different authorities. At present, 
there is no central portal where LAs can observe such behaviour. The underwriters 
have noted cases such as these but do not have full information. Under the current 
arrangement, they are also unable to inform multiple agencies if they observe such 
practices. This is particularly the case in the greater Dublin area (GDA), where 
potential buyers may be exploring a number of areas across a wide geographic 
area. Another potential complexity is the different recording of loan, financial and 
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other information across all the LAs and the ability to collate, merge and monitor 
these data in a consistent format.  
Given these complexities, further consideration should be given as to whether 
some, or a number, of aspects of the scheme could be centrally managed. For 
example, the use of a central application process may be beneficial whereby 
borrowers can apply to multiple councils on the one form and these cases are 
informed to all in the process. Further centralisation could be considered in terms 
of credit risk loss absorption buffers. Central information sharing templates and 
information gathering is also critical and we will provide some suggestions in 
regard to data gaps in the conclusions.  
Furthermore, given the considerable complexity (both operationally and from a 
compliance and oversight perspective) of running a major loan scheme, serious 
consideration should be given as to whether sufficient resources are currently 
available to the DHLGH and the other agencies involved in running this scheme, or 
whether these resources need to be enhanced. Such an operation requires 
considerable resources in order to be successful.  
5.3 INTEREST RATE PRICING 
At this juncture, it is useful to consider the pricing of the interest rates available to 
borrowers under the scheme. From its outset the scheme offered three interest 
rate products: (1) a variable rate priced at 2.3 per cent; (2) a 25 year fixed rate 
priced at 2 per cent, and (3) a 30 year fixed-rate product priced at 2.25 per cent. 
The components of the interest rate pricing are set out in Table 5.2. 
TABLE 5.2 THE COMPONENTS OF RIHL INTEREST RATE PRICING 
 Nature of charge (%) 
 Fixed rate – 25 years Fixed rate – 30 years Variable rate 
HFA rate 1.5 1.75 1.0 
MARP premium 0.25 0.25 0.8 
LA admin fee 0.25 0.25 0.5 
Rate charged  2.0 2.25 2.3 
 
Source:  DHLGH RIHL documentation. 
 
As of an August 2019 circular by the Department, the variable rate product is no 
longer offered as part of the scheme. These interest rates are low relative to rates 
available to borrowers in the commercial market. Figure 5.3 presents a histogram 
of market interest rate prices. The RIHL products (fixed rates) are the lowest 
interest rate product available in Ireland, assuming a 90 per cent loan-to-value 
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(LTV) ratio. Most mortgage interest rates are set between 2.8 and 3.3 per cent. 
There are only two offerings close to the RIHL rates, short-term fixed rates by Ulster 
Bank and KBC. In the commercial market, there are no interest rate products with 
a fixed-rate period above 10 years, which provides a considerable strategic 
difference for the RIHL loans.  
FIGURE 5.3 HISTOGRAM OF INTEREST RATES IN MARKET AND FOR RIHL LOANS  
 
Source: Bonkers.ie; consumerhelp.ie. 
 
For an equivalent loan size and term, the RIHL interest rates provide a lower 
instalment than what is available on the market, reflecting the lower rates. This is 
shown in Figure 5.4.  
 
FIGURE 5.4 HISTOGRAM OF INSTALMENTS FOR €288,000 LOAN AT 90 LTV IN MARKET AND FOR RIHL LOANS  
 
Source:  Bonkers.ie; consumerhelp.ie. 
 
As noted above, no banks currently provide fixed-term tenures above 10 years. 
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and Denmark), the RIHL loans offer the longest term and the lowest interest rate 
in the market. This is an unusual combination for interest rate pricing given that 
banks normally charge higher rates the longer the fixation term, because long-term 
fixed rates shift the interest rate risk from borrowers to banks (Kelly and Myers, 
2019). The exposure to cost of funding risk, inflation and long-term interest rates 
usually ensures that this relationship holds. Figure 5.5 shows how the pricing of 
Irish fixed-rate loans increases as the tenure moves from 4 to 10 years in duration.  
FIGURE 5.5 AVERAGE INTEREST RATE BY FIXED TERM LENGTH  
 
Fixed term length 
Source: Bonkers.ie; consumerhelp.ie. 
 
Along this dimension, it would be expected that the RIHL loans would set interest 
rates at higher levels than the shorter-term maturity loans. However, given that 
the LAs’ cost of funding is determined by long-term secure lending facilities 
provided by the HFA, the cost of funds can be lower than would be available to 
commercial financial institutions. Indeed, in regard to the cost of funding to the LA 
from the HFA, the funding cost for the variable rate loan is 1 per cent, rising to 1.5 
per cent for the 25 year fixed rate and 1.75 per cent for the 30 year fixed rate. 
Given this, and the fact that at the prevailing long-term rates available to the Irish 
government the HFA would be able to sanitise any term risk by fully hedging the 
current fixed rate liabilities, applying a lower cost of funds to the RIHL loans would 
appear suitable at present.34  
Two further considerations arise in relation to pricing: (1) is credit risk fully priced 
into the current interest rate?  (2) Are the RIHL interest rates too low relative to 
 
34  This does not take account of the fact that the variable rate option may increase in cost and this may lead to 
heightened default risk for borrowers.  
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the market, and could they create distortions regarding the incentives of 
borrowers? 
At present the credit risk of the loan is priced as follows. The Housing Circular 
38/2013 directed LAs to apply a mortgage arrears resolution process (MARP) 
premium rate of 0.8 per cent with effect from 1 January 2014 to all existing and 
new mortgages. This rate should continue on all variable-rate loans issued from 1 
February 2018, while a reduced MARP premium of 0.25% applies to new fixed-rate 
loans from 1 January 2018. This is set by the Loans Management Group. The lower 
MARP to be charged on all fixed-rate loans is due to lower default risk attached to 
fixed-rate rather than variable rate loans on account of the interest rate risk.  
A number of observations can be made based on the type of loan product, the 
default profile of the borrower pool and the LA lending experience. First, given the 
targeting of the loan at lower-income households, these loans are inherently 
higher risk than those allocated in the commercial market, which lends to higher 
income groups. Evidence shows that lower-income households have fewer buffers 
with which to absorb economic shocks (Corrigan et al., 2019) and therefore are 
most likely to go into default. As noted above, this suggests that the credit risk 
profile of the existing portfolio is higher than that of the commercial market. Under 
normal credit risk pricing circumstances, the credit risk component of the interest 
rate would be higher than for other borrowers in the market. Second, the lending 
experience of the LAs, with high arrears rates and low repossessions, would 
suggest a higher default risk is likely and loan resolution could be challenging with 
high expected losses.  
The other major consideration in regard to the pricing of RIHL loans relates to 
whether the level of the interest rate is correct so as to target the scheme to those 
who need it most in terms of credit access. The long fixed-rate duration would be 
attractive to most households considering purchasing in this price range. Given 
that to qualify borrowers must provide evidence of insufficient offers of finance, 
the RIHL loan product acts to lower credit constraints by providing credit to worthy 
borrowers. In this sense, the RIHL scheme acts as a lender of last resort for these 
households. Traditionally, to prevent distorting borrower behaviour (whereby 
borrowers would try to access the scheme when they could actually raise market 
finance), lender of last resort finance should be priced at higher than the natural 
long-term competitive market rate. If it is not, borrowers have the incentive to 
attempt to gain access to the scheme when they otherwise could have secure 
finance from the market.  
Given these two considerations (coupled with the concerns around the ability to 
prove insufficient finance and the cross-over between RIHL lending and the 
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commercial market in non-urban areas), we recommend that the interest rate be 
raised to above the level of the closest fixed-rate tenure available to the RIHL 
product in the market. In practice, this would mean the RIHL product should be 
priced above the most expensive 10-year fixed rate offered in Ireland as this is the 
longest comparison term available at present. Such a rate increase would be 
consistent with lender of last resort pricing and help to ensure that borrowers who 
can get credit in the commercial market are incentivised to do so. Pricing can be 
cognisant of the 0.5550 per cent mortgage protection insurance (MPI) that is 
compulsory for LA borrowers. It must be noted that raising the interest rate in this 
regard will in fact tighten the debt service to income (DSTI) restriction at the 
current 35 limit as it will raise the payment for a given term and loan balance. This 
would provide further credit risk protection as it would be a more stringent 
screening of borrowers.  
5.4 IMPACT ON HOUSING MARKET AND MACRO-FINANCIAL RISKS 
5.4.1 Impact of scheme on house prices to date 
In Ireland, a critical determinant of the house price appreciation occurring over the 
Celtic Tiger boom phase was rapid growth in credit under imprudent lending 
conditions. Understanding the sensitivity of house prices is therefore critical to 
assessing both macro-financial risks and the market dynamics over time. It is 
important to note from the outset that at present we may not expect to find any 
impact of the scheme on house prices given that the scheme has been in operation 
for only a short period and the fact that only 1021 loans had been drawn down by 
the end of June 2019. This should be monitored over time.  
The impact of the RIHL lending activity on house prices in Ireland depends on the 
extent to which it increases the overall level of credit drawn down. It is outside the 
scope of this study to undertake a full new econometric evaluation of the causal 
relationship between house prices and credit for first-time buyers (FTBs) in Ireland 
that would fully take into account the macroeconomic dynamics and endogeneity 
of housing and credit markets. However, to gauge the relative impact of the 
scheme lending on house prices in Ireland, we can use existing literature that 
estimates the relationship between credit growth and house prices to provide 
scenarios for the likely impulse that the growth in credit could have had. We can 
then compare this to the actual house price dynamics in the market to evaluate 
whether the introduction of the scheme was associated with an increase in prices 
in line with the scenarios.  
Our scenarios and estimates of the increase in credit as a result of RIHL are 
presented in Table 19 below. The steps that we deploy to develop the scenarios 
are as follows. We first take the value of drawdowns of RIHL loans from inception 
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to end of June 2019.35 Over this period a total of 1021 loans have been drawn 
down. Given coefficients from existing research (Kelly et al., 2018; Favara and Imbs, 
2015), we estimate that the impact on house prices would be less than one 
percentage point all else equal. These scenarios are hypothetical and do not 
attempt to explain the trend in house prices in Ireland as a function of the scheme.  
TABLE 5.3 ESTIMATED IMPACT OF RIHL LENDING ON HOUSE PRICES   
 RIHL lending to end June 2019 
 Volume Value 
RIHL 1021 €178,661,239 
BPFI (FTBs) 28,445 €6,262,000,000 
BPFI (total new house purchase credit) 46,783 €10,644,000,000 
Total FTBs 29,466 €6,440,661,239 
Total overall 47,804 €10,822,661,239 
   
RIHL increase over FTBs  3.6% 2.9% 
RIHL increase overall 2.2% 1.7% 
Percentage change in house prices  
Kelly et al. (2018) Coefficient FTBs – 0.23  0.7 
Kelly et al. (2018), Favara and Imbs (2015) Coefficient (2015) – 0.15  0.3 
 
Source:  DHLGH, Banking and Payments Federation (BPFI) and CSO data.  
 
Given the increase in the overall house price index between January 2018 and June 
2019 was only 6 per cent based on Central Statistics Office (CSO) data, it is highly 
unlikely that the lending under the scheme to date has had any material impact on 
market prices.36 Indeed, since the inception of the scheme prices have begun to 
moderate substantially (Figure 5.6), suggesting that other factors (outside the 
scheme) have been driving the dynamics of the housing market and putting 
downward pressure on price growth. Given that the scheme did not have many 
drawdowns until after June 2018, the full lending activity has come at a time of 
falling price inflation. It is therefore unlikely, with the low volume of the scheme 
relative to the overall market, that any inflationary pressures have occurred due to 
the RIHL lending.  
 
35  We use data to the end of June 2019 as these were the most recent available to us when the analysis was completed.  
36  The residential property price register is for all properties. It does not provide an index for FTB-specific houses, which 
is hedonically adjusted. While data for average prices for FTBs are available, the lack of a hedonic transformed series 
makes their use problematic.  
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FIGURE 5.6 HOUSE PRICE GROWTH SINCE 2017  
 
Source:  CSO house price data.  
 
Indeed, if we focus on the average FTB house price (no FTB index is available from 
the CSO) as presented in Figure 5.7, it is clear that the price level has been dropping 
throughout 2019 and the growth rate moderating over the period of the scheme.  
FIGURE 5.7 AVERAGE FTB HOUSE PRICES – Q1 2018–Q2 2019  
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National excluding Dublin - all residential properties
Dublin - all residential properties
Policy
102 | Rev iew of  the Rebui ld ing Ireland Home Loan Scheme  
 
 
Assessment of distributional bunching 
Another way to assess the potential impacts of the lending scheme on house prices 
is to explore whether the policy caused a ‘bunching’ of house purchases under the 
thresholds that would be allowed under the scheme. As the purchases eligible for 
RIHL borrowers are capped at €320,000 or €250,000 depending on the county, any 
impact on house prices would manifest itself in an acceleration of prices and 
increase in transactions below, or at, these points.  
To explore whether any effect of the policy can be identified in this manner, we 
take data from the Property Price Register (PPR), split them into time periods and 
by housing type, and visually investigate whether any distributional changes that 
could be attributed to the policy are observed. We focus on all buyer types here 
for two reasons. The first is purely data-driven, as no FTB identifier is available in 
the PPR. The second is that using all data is more appropriate as FTBs compete with 
second and subsequent buyers, as well as investors, and thus any impact on the 
market must account for cross-buyer-type market dynamics in the aggregate.  
Figure 5.8 presents the histogram (left) and kernel density plot (right) of the house 
price distribution (in euro levels) over time for 2018/2019 (the period in which the 
policy was in operation) and 2017 (the pre-policy period). The histogram splits the 
distribution into buckets of €10,000 from 0 to €500,000. Each bucket represents 
the share of total house prices that occurred in this price bracket. If the policy had 
a considerable impact on the market, two side-effects on the distribution would be 
evident. First, a large bunching of transactions at or just below the maximum house 
price thresholds, which we have here depicted as solid black lines at €250,000 and 
€320,000, would be expected. Second, we would expect this bunching not to be 
evident in the pre-policy period. 
It must be noted that given the increase in house prices over time, we do expect 
the overall distribution for the period 2018/2019 to have moved to the right of the 
2017 distribution. This movement would be expected in the absence of the policy 
and would reflect the overall growth in nominal house prices over time. These 
differences would be even more evident once smoothed by a kernel density 
function, which is also presented. Figure 5.9 presents the histograms (left) and 
kernel density plots (right) for the overall national market, including new and 
second-hand properties.  
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FIGURE 5.8 HISTOGRAM AND KERNEL DENSITY PLOTS OF ALL HOUSE PRICES 2017–2019  
  
Source: Authors’ analysis of PPR data.  
 
On visual inspection of the distributional shapes, while there are clusters at 
particular price points in the 2018/2019 distribution, these do not appear to be 
bunching excessively at the scheme limits. There is some bunching just below the 
€250,000 threshold but, given that our analysis of the loan-level data in Chapter 3 
indicates that very few loans are at this level, it is unlikely that this is caused by the 
scheme. For the higher limit, analysis of the density plot suggests no evidence of 
kinks in the distribution at the limit. Indeed, the trend density in the two periods 
appears to be reasonably steady over time. This evidence would suggest that the 
scheme has not had any material side-effects on the overall price distribution.  
Figure 5.9 splits the distribution between new and second-hand properties. For 
existing properties, a similar conclusion to the overall market is evident. There do 
appear to be some differences in the distributional shape for the new properties 
market; however, given that relatively few RIHL loans have been provided for new 









104 | Rev iew of  the Rebui ld ing Ireland Home Loan Scheme  
 
 







Source:  Authors’ analysis of PPR data.  
 
 
Given the concentration of the use of the scheme in the GDA and other urban 
areas, it is useful to split this analysis by the different regions to appraise whether 
the scheme had regional specific effects. Having an effect on a specific geographic 
market does not mean that the overall national house price distribution has been 
affected, but provides some insight into localised economic impacts of the policies 
if they arise. To do this, we focus on three groupings: (1) the cluster of counties for 
which the house price limit was €320,000; (2) the counties for which the house 
price limit was €250,000; and (3) Dublin, which has received a large majority of the 
allocations to date. The charts relating to this assessment are presented in 
Appendix I. Looking across these regions, there do not appear to be any distortions 
that are consistent with the effects described above, which would have occurred 
had the introduction of the RIHL policy impacted the market.  
It must be noted that an inspection such as this is not a full causal identification of 
the effects of the policy, which would require a more thorough and rigorous 
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econometric analysis. This is outside the scope of this report but, where data were 
available, such an analysis would be important future research. This should be 
coupled with an assessment of the impact of credit across the house price 
distribution, in particular relating to FTB house prices.  
The impact of the scheme on house prices nationally depends on the current level 
of drawdowns over the 17 months from inception to June 2018 (€178m). If the 
drawdowns were to accelerate rapidly, in a short space of time, this might have an 
impact on the market nationally or on specific areas of the price distribution in 
certain locations. The scheme funding has been increased to €563m in total. If this 
was to be allocated fully within the remainder of 2019, any stimulatory effects 
would have to be re-evaluated based on the market conditions. However, the 
drawdowns to September 2019 indicate approximately 1250 loans at just under 
€218m, which does not point to a major acceleration from June 2019.  
5.4.2 Broader macro-financial considerations 
Two broader macro-financial considerations arise relating to the impact of the loan 
facility on overall government indebtedness and on systemic risk in the mortgage 
market more generally.  
Contribution to government debt 
It has been confirmed in interdepartmental documentation that the Rebuilding 
Ireland Home Loan (RIHL) activity does not impact the general government 
balance. The effect on the general government debt is determined by the extent 
to which borrowing by the HFA to fund the scheme requires additional borrowing 
by the NTMA.  
The risk that arises from the first consideration is whether the borrowing facility 
would materially increase the overall level of government debt, which would 
increase vulnerabilities and lower the borrowing capacity of the sovereign. Total 
government debt is currently standing at approximately €200bn (see Figure 5.10). 
Given the total facility to June has exposures of €363m, with drawdowns of €178m, 
it is unlikely that this level of lending would lead to any major government 
indebtedness risks. If the volume of lending through the scheme were to rise 
considerably, this issue would need to be revisited. Managing this risk would 
suggest that a clear and limited annual lending volume that does not materially 
increase the total debt stock is warranted. If the scheme is to continue on an 
annualised basis, given the long-term structure of mortgage debt, the overall 
portfolio level of debt should be tracked carefully.  
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FIGURE 5.10 GOVERNMENT INDEBTEDNESS – NTMA DATA 
 
Source: NTMA Investor Briefing, August 2019. 
 
 
Systemic risk in the mortgage market 
The risk that the RIHL scheme could add to systemic risks in the mortgage market 
relates to the extent to which higher originating credit conditions on these loans 
would lead borrowers to have fewer buffers with which to absorb shocks or lead 
to house price credit spirals. In this case, if a negative economic event occurs, and 
these loans sour, the higher default rate could propagate through the system, 
leading to a rise in systemic risk.  
Even with a high default level, the low share of such loans in the total new FTB 
lending market (RIHL represents less than 3 per cent of the total lending) would 
indicate that the ability to contribute to systemic risk is low at present. For 
example, even if all loans were to default, this would lead to an overall default 
contribution of less than 3 per cent of the new lending in the period since RIHL 
began. A position paper prepared by the Central Bank of Ireland (CBI) for the 
Financial Stability Group also noted a low level of systemic risk of the scheme given 
its current parameters (Financial Stability Group, 2019). 
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5.5 OTHER CONSIDERATIONS 
With RIHL, the main risks relate to credit losses by the LAs. Extending considerable 
additional loans (relative to its current loan exposure) naturally exposes the public 
authority sector to additional risks. For LAs where the lending is large relative to 
their size, any considerable loan losses could hamper their ability to provide other 
services as they will still be liable to pay the HFA funding. This was noted as a risk 
in the consultations for this review by an LA. Central facility allocations should be 
cognisant of this when issuing drawing amounts.  
It must be noted, given the current volume of the scheme, that the main risk is that 
of credit defaults and loan losses. As the borrowing households wouldn’t 
necessarily borrow a similar valued mortgage in the open market, the risk arising 
is not fully a transfer of risk from private to public and rather should be seen as an 
increase in credit risk exposures for some LAs: i.e. banks are not passing off risk; 
rather the state is taking risk in order to support homeownership. However, the 
cost to the state of the housing need for these households is not eliminated 
without the scheme. Indeed, many of these households may end up entitled to 
state supports given the income profile of applications and the social housing 
income qualification criteria, which is a direct cost to the exchequer. Our discussion 
of the credit risk assessments and management in Chapter 4 outlines the main risks 
of the scheme.  
5.6 CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS 
• Drawdowns from the scheme to June 2019 amounted to €178m. This represents 
approximately 3 per cent of total FTB lending for this period. Our assessment of house 
price dynamics, simulations for house price impacts and assessment of distributional 
changes in house prices suggests that the scheme has not had an impact on house prices 
nationally to date given the current drawdowns. A further €40m was lent out in Q3, 
bringing the total lending to 1250 loans at a value of €218m. 
• Demand for the scheme appears to have outstripped the original scheme volume of 
€200m over a 3 year period and approvals have continued above this figure. Following 
this increase in demand, the DHLGH received sanction to increase the scheme size to 
€563 across 2018 and 2019. Careful monitoring of allocations, approvals and drawdowns 
should be undertaken on a timely basis to ensure that scheme commitments stay within 
the sanctioned amount. 
•  The geographic concentration of demand is greatest in the urban areas and excess 
demand may exist in these areas. This poses challenges for the current system of 
allowances at an LA level. If an alternative mechanism could be developed to ensure 
activity remains within the sanctioned amount, it would be potentially more efficient to 
move away from a strict LA-level allowance. 
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• It has been proposed that in future the overall size of the scheme will be limited to 5 per 
cent of total FTB credit. This has the benefit of ensuring that the scheme does not become 
so large as to present major macro-financial risks or impact the broader market. 
However, a drawback is that it ties the level of scheme lending to the commercial market. 
If the commercial market undergoes a credit crunch, this may lower how much lending 
can be achieved, at precisely the point when the credit gap is greatest and the state may 
wish to act counter-cyclically. Monitoring compliance with this in real time may be 
difficult and present challenges in matching demand to approvals and drawdowns. In lieu 
of this, an annualised minimum level in addition to the 5 per cent limit target that is set 
with respect to, but not bound to, the level of market lending might be preferable. For 
example, the rule could be that RIHL lending is limited to 5 per cent of FTB lending or 
approximately €200m per annum, whichever is greater.  
• The interest rates set by the scheme are lower than those in the commercial market, and 
offer longer fixed terms. It is a clear benefit to borrowers to have low and predictable 
interest rates. However, two issues must be considered for pricing. This product is aimed 
at lower-income households, who are unable to access credit commercially; existing 
evidence would suggest these households carry a higher credit risk. Furthermore, a 
scheme that acts in essence as lender of last resort credit would normally carry a mark-
up over the market price so as to ensure no distortions to borrowers’ incentives and to 
maximise the benefit of the scheme by ensuring it is targeted at those who most require 
these supports.37 Given both of these considerations, we recommend raising the base 
interest rate to above the level for the most comparable fixed term product in the market 
(currently 10 years) for future iterations of the scheme to compensate for credit risks in 
the targeted borrower cohort and to ensure that market distortions are minimised. 
Pricing can be cognisant of the cost of the MPI cover at 0.5550 per cent. Raising the 
interest rate will tighten the existing 35 per cent net income restriction, which is a positive 
step from a credit risk perspective. 
• The level of pricing of the cost of funds to the LA from the HFA is in line with the cost to 
the state of long-term credit. For the HFA, any term risk or interest rate misalignment risk 
can therefore be mitigated through hedging should they wish. However, given the 
fluctuation in the cost of long-term funding to the state, future facilities under the 
scheme should constantly review the base funding rate and ensure that it is in line with 
long-term funding costs. Operationally, a closer mapping of loan drawdowns with LA 
facility drawdown would better help the HFA to understand the exposures. 
• The level of the scheme at present does not appear to pose considerable risks to 
government indebtedness or other macro-financial considerations. If the volume of 
lending increases markedly in excess of the current share of FTB lending, this should be 
reappraised.  
 
37  Indeed, other government supports for enterprises such as the Credit Guarantee Scheme and the Microfinance Loan 
Scheme set interest rates above the market price for bank lending.  
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• In any re-parameterisation of the scheme, policymakers should be cognisant of ensuring 
continuity and minimising market distortions.  
 
 




Conclusions and policy implications 
The aim of this study has been to provide a high-level review of (i) the degree to 
which the Rebuilding Ireland Home Loan (RIHL) scheme has met its objectives, (ii) 
the ongoing market need for the intervention, (iii) the impact on the broader 
market, and (iv) selected operational considerations such as credit risk and funding 
assessments.  
In this chapter, we first provide a summary of the main findings of each of the 
analytical topics. Second, we present an outline for bridging and eliminating data 
gaps that have been identified as part of this review. We also provide suggestions 
for monitoring and stress testing of the credit risks going forward.  
6.1 SUMMARY OF MAIN FINDINGS 
Market demand and scheme calibration 
• The RIHL loan scheme had approximately €363m in drawdowns (€178m) or live approvals 
(€185m) from February 2018 to June 2019. Drawdowns to June 2019 accounted for 3 per 
cent of first-time buyer (FTB) lending. Our analysis of the scheme covers this period 
(February 2018–June 2019). As an update, a further €40m was drawn down in Q3 2019, 
bringing total drawdowns as of end September 2019 to €218m, with total outstanding 
live approvals of €196m (total funds €414m). 
• Microsimulation research indicates a credit gap in the Irish FTB mortgage market, which 
could be met under prudent credit risk assessment. Both income and equity constraints 
are evident, suggesting that separate policies covering loan availability and deposit 
supports are merited. 
• There is a clear role for RIHL in alleviating a portion of this unmet mortgage demand on 
an ongoing basis. Estimates suggest that the instrument could provide a minimum of 
1000 loans, valued at €200m per annum at current market prices. 
• It is clear that RIHL would be expected to improve housing affordability for recipients 
relative to renting at new market prices or purchasing under commercial terms. 
Mortgages with a fixed term for the duration of the loan are welcome in order to remove 
interest rate risk for households and improve payment predictability. 
• Residential mortgage lending, i.e. loans issued by regulated lenders, is concentrated at 
higher levels of the income distribution and RIHL offers credit to lower-income 
households. 
• At present, there is little evidence to support an increase in the €320,000 house price cap 
in urban areas given the targeting of the scheme to low- to middle-income households. 
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In these areas, the limitation of single borrower income thresholds of €50,000 would 
appear binding and could be revisited. 
• The house price cap of €250,000 for other areas would appear to be well in excess of 
most market prices in many counties and should be lowered markedly. The potential for 
a lower third tier, which would distinguish more urban areas in the €250,000 group (such 
as Limerick and Waterford) from more rural counties, should be considered. 
Credit risk and credit assessment 
• The scheme has aligned its loan-to-value (LTV) ratio with the level set by the Central Bank 
of Ireland (CBI) for FTBs, 90 per cent. Such an alignment is prudent. 
• The credit assessment includes a maximum debt service to income (DSTI) ratio, which is 
used internationally by many countries as a macroprudential tool. The calibration of the 
RIHL limit at a maximum of 35 per cent would appear to be in the prudent range relative 
to international norms. The maximum tightens to 30 per cent for lower-income 
households, which is sensible. A tightening of the open allowance for lending above the 
cap should be explored. 
• As of June 2019, the default rate for RIHL loans (in arrears of 90 days or more) was 0.4 
per cent, which is identical to the default rate on commercial loans with a similar vintage 
from CBI data. 
• No data on LTV or loan-to-income (LTI) ratios at origination are available to analyse, and 
this data gap should be addressed with haste. Requested LTI data have been reviewed 
using microdata from the Housing Agency. 
• It is likely that the default rate on the RIHL loans will exceed that on market loans over 
time. As the aim of the scheme is to extend credit to low-income households, once 
sufficient credit policy safeguards are followed at origination, a marginally higher default 
rate on RIHL loans would not necessarily undermine the achievement of the scheme 
objectives. A withdrawal of RIHL lending for areas with arrears greater than 5 per cent of 
the portfolio has been introduced to safeguard against high portfolio losses that may 
arise. 
• A strong feature of the scheme is the centralised credit assessment. However, 
operationally, it is at the discretion of local authority (LA) credit committees to make the 
final decision on the application. The data indicate approvals have exceeded the level 
suggested by the underwriters in some LAs. Without access to adequate microdata at 
origination, it is not possible to assess whether this has already exposed the current 
portfolio to higher risks. The Department of Housing, Local Government and Heritage 
(DHLGH) has already taken welcome steps to address this issue by ensuring that 
deviations from the underwriting assessment are reported and explained. Some further 
options for strengthening such safeguards could be considered along with further credit-
risk-minimising rules. 
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• Given the scale of the RIHL scheme relative to previous LA lending, it would be prudent 
to take stock of the policies, procedures and capacity of LAs to manage and absorb loan 
delinquencies.  
Market impact, scheme funding and interest rate pricing 
• Drawdowns from the scheme to June 2019 amounted to €178m, approximately 3 per 
cent of total FTB lending for this period. Our analysis suggests that the scheme has not 
had any material impact on house prices nationally to date, given the current level of 
drawdowns. 
• Demand for the scheme appears to have outstripped the original scheme volume of 
€200m over a 3 year period and approvals have continued above this figure. Following 
this increase in demand, the DHLGH received sanction to increase the scheme size to 
€563 across 2018 and 2019. Careful monitoring of allocations, approvals and drawdowns 
should be undertaken on a timely basis to ensure that scheme commitments stay within 
the sanctioned amount. 
• The geographic concentration of demand is greatest in the urban areas and excess 
demand may exist in these areas. This poses challenges for the current system of 
allowances at LA level. If an alternative mechanism could be developed to ensure activity 
remains within the sanctioned amount, it would be potentially more efficient to move 
away from a strict LA level allowance. 
• The DHLGH has agreed a scheme value limit which restricts lending to 5 per cent of total 
FTB credit. Such a restriction is welcome. However, directly anchoring it to the broader 
market restricts the ability to use the instrument counter-cyclically, i.e. if credit supply 
restricts the borrowing capacity of FTBs, the 5 per cent limit could be temporarily 
revisited. A blended rule could set a 5 per cent cap with a minimum of approximately 
€200m per annum, whichever is greater. 
• For any loan product, the pricing of the interest rate is critical. The interest rates set by 
the scheme are lower, and at longer terms, than products in the market. This provides an 
affordability boost for recipient borrowers, in particular as the low fixed rate-term is for 
the duration of the loan. 
• However, two further points must be considered for pricing. First, interest rates should 
be set to adequately compensate for credit risks and second, pricing should be such as to 
minimise distortions to borrower incentives and maximise the benefit of the scheme to 
those who most require these supports. Therefore, the base interest rate should be 
increased to above the rate in the market for the closest fixed-rate product to the RIHL 
terms (currently 10 years). This is consistent with lender of last resort pricing. Pricing can 
be cognisant of the cost of the mortgage protection insurance (MPI) product at 0.5550 
per cent. Raising the rate will also increase the stringency of the existing 35 per cent net 
income limit, as it will increase the repayment for a given term and loan balance. This will 
enhance the credit risk assessment. 
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• The level of pricing of the cost of funds to the LA from the Housing Finance Agency (HFA) 
is in line with the cost to the state of long-term finance. Term risk or interest rate 
misalignment risk can therefore be mitigated through hedging. Future facilities under the 
scheme should constantly review the base funding rate to align it to long-term funding 
costs. 
• The level of the scheme at present does not appear to pose considerable risks to 
government indebtedness or other macro-financial considerations. If lending increases 
markedly above the current share of FTB lending that is accounted for by the RIHL 
product, this should be reappraised. 
• In any re-parameterisation of the scheme, policymakers should be cognisant of ensuring 
continuity and minimising market or borrower incentive distortions.  
In concluding this analysis, we find a clear gap that RIHL can address on the demand 
side of the market. In undertaking parameter changes or recalibrations of the 
scheme, policymakers should be cognisant of ensuring its continuation with 
minimum disruption to the market. This will provide more clarity for households 
who are looking to access the loan, in particular around the issue of applications 
and approvals in principle, which may span any date of parameter change.  
While we identify a demand-side gap that RIHL can address, the critical bottleneck 
in the Irish housing market is the level of housing supply, i.e. building or bringing 
back into use more housing units, in particular at the low end of the price 
distribution. Given the clear structural excess demand for housing, demand-side 
instruments are likely to be relatively more inflationary when supply is tight. 
Policies addressing the supply side will be more effective for the overall market 
than demand-side measures.  
6.2 DATA GAPS AND MONITORING 
Through the course of this review a number of data gaps have been identified 
which, if addressed, would considerably strengthen the management of the credit 
risk of the scheme as well as its targeting and functionality. A range of data sources 
have been reviewed and these are listed in Table 2.2. These include monthly 
submissions to the DHLGH by the LGMA on the RIHL loans, the loan-level data held 
by the Department in relation to existing LA drawdowns and the summary data 
provided by the Housing Agency relating to the underwriting activity. Furthermore, 
working through the process of matching and reconciling the different datasets 
provides additional insights into where and how data could be best collected to 
help understand and safeguard the policy.  
The following data gaps have been identified. 
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• No centralised database is available that captures the loan exposures, monitors credit 
performance, and contains collateral values and originating borrower characteristics. In 
particular, no data are available to analyse centrally on LTV, LTI or DSTI ratios on the 
originated loans. 
• The Housing Agency database, which maintains a limited number of fields relative to the 
overall application, is not available to the DHLGH officials for analysis, nor is it available 
to all LAs. These data, from the underwriting assessment, are critical to understanding 
the credit risk, efficacy of the policy and the correct targeting of the scheme. 
• At present, borrowers can apply to multiple LAs and potentially receive different credit 
outcomes. LAs cannot monitor applications to other areas or request data from the 
underwriters for applications to other schemes. 
A working group should be established to outline data requirements and ensure 
that data gaps are eliminated. This would fully review the data collected on specific 
fields and ensure that proper data collection is undertaken. This group would 
ensure that data protection issues are complied with. One suggestion is to match 
the loan records with the Property Price Register (PPR) if no collateral values are 
currently stored by LAs. Standardised collection templates should be followed by 
all LAs and any inconsistencies in reporting and data collection across LAs should 
be identified and standardised. 
A considerable strength in the current data architecture is that the DHLGH already 
receives loan-level data from all the LAs. This provides a ready-made mechanism 
to collect and deliver new data and can be used to receive all required information 
on the loan performance, characteristics and some limited borrower fields needed 
for credit risk assessments. However, the use of the RIHL loan identifier included 
in the DGI loan-level data can be inconsistent, with some LAs not systematically 
classifying loans. This is a serious data gap that should be addressed.  
Furthermore, given the considerable complexity (both operationally and from a 
compliance and oversight perspective) of running a major loan scheme, serious 
consideration should be given to enhancing the resources available to the DHLGH 
and other agencies in running this scheme.  
6.2.1 Ongoing stress testing and monitoring 
It is good practice in terms of understanding loan portfolio risks and planning for 
economic shocks to undertake regular credit stress tests to provide estimates of 
the potential loan losses under various macroeconomic scenarios. For example, 
the European Banking Authority undertakes biannual stress tests of the main 
systemically important credit institutions in Europe with a view to exploring their 
capital adequacy. Risks relating to house price changes, unemployment increases 
and interest rate rises are key considerations.  
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The collection of microdata proposed above should facilitate the development of 
regular portfolio stress tests of the LAs and assess the exposure of the loans to 
economic risks. Research should be undertaken to develop the database and 
model for such analysis.  
Furthermore, following the stress testing, the data can also then be used to explore 
whether the parameters of the scheme are still fit for purpose relative to the 
overall policy objectives. The use of such granular microdata is now central to good 
policymaking and evaluation nationally and internationally, and should be 
leveraged to its maximum for this scheme. The use of microdata by the CBI in the 
calibration of macroprudential measures and in the stress testing of bank mortgage 
portfolios is a good example of this.  
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Additional charts and tables 
 
TABLE A.1 CORRIGAN ET AL. SENSITIVITY CHECK – TENTH PERCENTILE OF HOUSE PRICE 
DISTRIBUTION 
 Baseline Tenth percentile house price sensitivity check 
Flow of bankable demand   
Implied additional no. loans (approvals)   
10% 1869 2589 
30% 5608 7766 
50% 9347 12943 
Implied additional value loans (€bn)   
10% 0.39 0.48 
30% 1.17 1.44 
50% 1.95 2.4 
Implied RIHL loans (approvals)   
Implied additional no. loans   
10% 1163 1375 
30% 3489 4125 
50% 5815 6875 
Implied additional value loans (€bn)   
10% 0.2 0.23 
30% 0.59 0.675 
50% 0.98 1.125 
 
Source: Corrigan et al. (forthcoming). 
 
TABLE A.2 COMPARISON OF KEY MEASURES BETWEEN APPROVED AND REJECTED APPLICANTS 
  Recommended for approval Recommended to reject 
Mean income 44,188 40,246 
Median income 43,848 39,310 
Mean age 36 37 
% in permanent employment 94.8 90.3 
Mean total savings 23,443 17,740 
Mean ReLTI 4.26 4.43 
 
Source: Housing Agency microdata. 
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FIGURE A.1  REQUESTED LOAN SIZE DISTRIBUTION BY NUMBER OF APPLICANTS IN €320,000 AND €250,000 
HOUSE PRICE THRESHOLD AREAS 
(a) €320k areas       (b) €250k areas  
 
Source:  Housing Agency microdata. All valid applications. 
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FIGURE A.2  DISTRIBUTION OF LOAN SIZE FOR RIHL ISSUED LOANS TO JUNE 2019 FOR DUBLIN LAS  
(a) Dublin City    (b) DLR  
  
(c) Fingal           (d) South Dublin 
 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations based on DGI loan-level data.  
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FIGURE A.3  HISTOGRAM AND KERNEL DENSITY PLOTS OF HOUSE PRICES 2017–2019 – COUNTIES WITH RIHL 
HOUSE PRICE CAPPED AT €320,000  
Overall 
Histogram Kernel density plot 
  
Existing properties 
Histogram Kernel density plot 
  
New properties 
Histogram Kernel density plot 
  
 
 Source:  Authors’ analysis of Property Price Register data.  
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FIGURE A.4  HISTOGRAM AND KERNEL DENSITY PLOTS OF HOUSE PRICES 2017–2019 – COUNTIES WITH RIHL 
HOUSE PRICE CAPPED AT €250,000  
Overall 
Histogram Kernel density plot 
  
Existing Properties 
Histogram Kernel density plot 
  
New Properties 
Histogram Kernel density plot 
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FIGURE A.5  HISTOGRAM AND KERNEL DENSITY PLOTS OF HOUSE PRICES 2017–2019 – DUBLIN  
Overall 
Histogram Kernel density plot 
  
Existing properties 
Histogram Kernel density plot 
  
New Properties 
Histogram Kernel density plot 
  
Source:  Authors’ analysis of PPR data.  
 
  




Online mortgage calculator examples 
 
FIGURE A.6  BANK OF IRELAND MORTGAGE CALCULATOR EXAMPLE  
 
 
Source: Bank of Ireland website. 
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FIGURE A.7  AIB MORTGAGE CALCULATOR EXAMPLE  
 
Source:  AIB website. 
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